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ARTICLES
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY
IN ALASKA
THOMAS V. VAN FLEIN*
This Article examines Alaska’s products liability jurisprudence in
relation to the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability,
the American Law Institute’s most recent formulation of the law
of torts.  The Article begins with an analysis of the Alaska Su-
preme Court’s seminal products liability decisions, including the
Court’s partial adoption of products liability provisions from the
First and Second Restatements.  The Article then analyzes the
provisions of the Third Restatement, comparing them with current
Alaska law.  The Article next analyzes Alaska’s preference for
preserving the doctrinal wall between negligence principles and
products liability principles, concluding that the Third Restate-
ment does not recognize this distinction.  The author concludes
that the Third Restatement should be adopted only to the extent
that it does not conflict with Alaska law, and in conformity with
Alaska’s adoption of First and Second Restatement provisions.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) completed its re-
statement of the law regarding products liability with the publica-
tion of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.1  The ALI expanded its
treatment of products liability into a separate volume as opposed
to its previous status as a subpart (section 402A) of the Restate-
Copyright © 2000 by Thomas V. Van Flein.  This Article is also available on the
World Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/17ALRVanFlein.
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1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
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ment (Second) of Torts.2  The ALI first promulgated section 402A
in 1964.  By eliminating the traditional requirement of privity, sec-
tion 402A recognized the development of strict products liability,
which allowed consumers to bring actions directly against manufac-
turers or distributors.3  The Second Restatement “has been called
‘the most widely accepted distillation of the common law of
torts.’”4  Thirty-four years after section 402A earned a broad fol-
lowing among the states,5 the ALI has engaged in a “total over-
haul” of the Second Restatement, and section 402A in particular,
by drafting the Third Restatement.6
The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, though
criticized by some as too political,7 nevertheless recognized
emerging trends and decisions adopted by the various states.8  In-
2. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3. The doctrine of strict liability essentially began with MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), which abandoned privity of contract with a
manufacturer as a prerequisite to tort liability for a defective product.
4. In re Maldonado, 228 B.R. 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Field v. Mans,
516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)).
5. The Second Restatement’s provisions regarding products liability enjoy
popularity in the federal courts as well.  See, e.g., Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Ma-
rine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We hold that strict
products liability actions have become sufficiently well-established to justify its
being incorporated into the law of admiralty . . . .  We hold that the correct law to
be applied to this case is expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
(1965), as it is the best expression of the doctrine as it is generally applied . . . .”).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. (1998); see also
David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated:  Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 746 (“The Gospel According to Prosser, as it
were, has been rewritten.”).
7. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation:  Remarks on the Draft Re-
statement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 215, 217-20 (1997) (as-
serting that the Restatement reporters were essentially advocating different politi-
cal positions); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is
Prepared:  The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability Section 2(b) De-
sign Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 279 (1997) (summarizing that “[t]he
treatment of design defect in the Restatement (Third) is a political statement” and
concluding that it did not properly reflect existing case law).
8. Two of the reporters for the Third Restatement prepared a lengthy reply
to this criticism and justified their approach:
Some critics . . . have argued that the project was highly politicized, with
the Reporters acting as brokers negotiating compromises among power-
ful interests.  Having served as the Reporters in question, we would like
to set the record straight.  In no meaningful sense of the term did we
“play politics” in our roles as drafters of the new Restatement . . . .
Stated differently, we sincerely believe that the new Restatement is as
good as we were capable of making it.  We are human and surmise it is
VANFLEIN.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:12 AM
2000] PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN ALASKA 3
stead of shrinking from the “politicized” characterization, the ALI
justified its approach on the ground that products liability is “of
course ‘political’ in that it involves issues of distributive justice and
has attracted the attention of vocal and aggressive partisans.”9  Ac-
cordingly, controversial and disputed issues had to be scrutinized in
drafting a new restatement and the ALI attempted to synthesize a
consensus view.  In some areas, however, the Third Restatement
did slightly more than simply restate or codify the law followed in a
majority of jurisdictions; it set forth some concepts that were not
well settled, even by the ALI’s own admission.10
Historically, Alaska has only embraced portions of the Second
Restatement and expressly rejected key elements.  In several mate-
rial respects, Alaska has applied its own unique formulation for
products liability.  It has adopted a three-pronged approach to
products liability where a product “may be defective because of a
manufacturing defect, a defective design, or a failure to contain
adequate warnings.”11  In this respect, Alaska has set its own course
and applied the Second Restatement only when it conformed with
the better-reasoned public policy.  In Montana, the Supreme Court
explained a similar relationship with the Restatement:
We have stated that this Court shall not blindly follow the dic-
tates of the Restatement commentaries.  We emphasize that this
Court adopted the rule as set out in the Restatement, but we did
not and do not intend the restraints in the comments to this rule
to hamstring us in developing and refining the rule of strict li-
ability.  To the extent that the comments are helpful in our de-
velopment of the law, we shall accept them; but we will reject
them where we believe a more appropriate explanation of the
rule of strict liability can be provided.12
As discussed more fully below, this statement reflects the Alaska
Supreme Court’s approach as well.  This Article evaluates several
provisions of the Third Restatement  and compares them to exist-
ing Alaska law.  The goal is to examine the policy governing prod-
not perfect. But we also know it is not a “political” document as the
phrase is commonly used.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liabil-
ity Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667-68 (1998).
9. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB., xv (1998).
10. See id. at 4 (“Section 2(b) generated considerable controversy.”).
11. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992); see also Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878 n.15 (Alaska 1979) (hereinafter
“Beck I”).  This case will be referred to as Beck I since a second Beck opinion was
handed down several years later.  See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d
790 (Alaska 1981) (hereinafter “Beck II”).
12. McJunkin v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys., Inc., 748 P.2d 910, 917 (Mont.
1987).
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ucts liability, clarify the present status of Alaska products liability
law, and then reconcile both with the Third Restatement and ulti-
mately provide reasoned recommendations regarding the prospec-
tive application or adoption of some of these provisions in light of
existing Alaska law.  This Article begins with a thirty-year over-
view of Alaska products liability law and then juxtaposes the cur-
rent state of this law with the Third Restatement modifications.
II.  DIFFERENTIATING “STRICT” LIABILITY FROM
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Before discussing the provisions of the Third Restatement as
they relate to current Alaska law, one caveat is in order:  the term
“strict” should generally be avoided as a modifier of the term
“products liability” unless referring to manufacturing defects (as
opposed to design or warning defects) or vicarious liability imposed
on sellers and retailers.  Use of the traditional term “strict products
liability” is not utilized herein except when discussing manufactur-
ing defects or vicarious liability of sellers; it creates a false aura of
absolute liability where none exists.  Rather, the doctrine is simply
referred to as “products liability.”
This is done for three reasons.  First, use of the term “strict”
relative to a manufacturer is a misnomer that implies “absolute li-
ability” irrespective of defect.  The Alaska Supreme Court, in Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck (“Beck I”),13 reasoned that “manufac-
turers are not absolute insurers of their products” and that
plaintiffs must prove more than harm from the product.14  Thus, use
13. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
14. Id. at 879.
Although courts and commentators have struggled with diverse ap-
proaches to strict products liability, most authorities appear to agree that
manufacturers are not absolute insurers of their products.  Strict liability
will not impose legal responsibility simply because a product causes
harm.  A product must be defective as marketed if liability is to attach,
and “defective” must mean something more than a condition causing
physical injury.
Id.; see also Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1063-64
(Alaska 1979) (“[W]e think that ‘scientific knowability’ of the injurious nature of
the product should be considered because, otherwise, imposition of liability for a
design defect would effectively mean absolute liability even though there is no al-
ternative way for the manufacturer to discover the risk and remedy it.  Such a
situation would be incompatible with our previous decisions holding that manu-
facturers are not absolute insurers of their products.”); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp.,
463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983 ) (“The necessity of proving a defect in the product
as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case distinguishes strict from absolute liabil-
ity . . . .”).
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of the term “strict” is avoided here to eliminate even the inference
of absolute liability against a manufacturer, notwithstanding the
fact that many Alaska decisions qualify products liability with the
term “strict.”15  This also avoids confusion with true strict liability
relative to ultrahazardous activities, where liability is imposed for
any injury irrespective of the safety precautions taken.16
It is more accurate to state that once a defect is proven, the
manufacturer will be liable for that product defect if it caused in-
jury, since proof of a defect is “tantamount to fault in the sense that
we will impose legal responsibility for it.”17  For manufacturing de-
fect cases, the term “strict” is more apropos since liability is certain
if the plaintiff can establish that the product purchased differed
from what the manufacturer intended to make (and that difference
caused harm).18
In contrast, it is questionable whether the liability for design
products liability really is “strict.”  Decisions in this area, especially
under a risk-utility analysis, inevitably balance competing designs,
15. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1215
(Alaska 1998); Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc., 925 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Alaska
1996) (“We have refused to impose strict liability based upon failure to warn of
‘hazards or dangers that would be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the
product.’” (quoting Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984))).
16. See Matomco Oil Co., Inc. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336, 1341
(Alaska 1990) (holding that “welding, buffing, or grinding of a petroleum tanker . .
. is not an ultrahazardous activity” where strict liability would be imposed as op-
posed to proof of negligence); Yukon Equipment v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585
P.2d 1206, 1210 (Alaska 1978) (discussing the court’s role in determining whether
an activity is “abnormally dangerous” under the Second Restatement or consti-
tutes an “ultrahazardous activity” as defined in the First Restatement); Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Wash. 1972) (hauling gasoline constitutes an
ultrahazardous activity subjecting the defendant to strict liability for any resulting
harm).  It is improbable for a product to be subject to “strict liability” under an
ultrahazardous activity analysis; a flame thrower might be such an example.
17. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 889 (“[S]trict products liability is not absolute liability
but stems from the existence of a defect.  The production and marketing of a de-
fective product is tantamount to ‘fault’ in the sense that we will impose legal re-
sponsibility for it.”).
18. See id. at 880 (holding that “manufacturing flaws can be evaluated against
the intended design of the product”); Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 838 P.2d
1243, 1246 (Alaska 1992) (imposing liability where “the absorption of the fuel by
the float was a result of a defect in the manufacturing process”); Colt Indus. Op-
erating Corp., Quincy Compressor Div. v. Frank W. Murphy Mfr., 822 P.2d 925,
930 (Alaska 1991) (discussing manufacturing defects versus design defects (some-
times finding little demarcation between the two) as well as the argument that
manufacturing defects occur where there are “deviation[s] from the condition in-
tended by the manufacturer”).
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and implicitly weigh the “reasonableness” of the product design
with product alternatives.  Negligence is a concept rooted in rea-
sonableness.19  To the extent courts, at least in part, utilize reason-
ableness principles in the risk-benefit analysis, it does not help to
clothe the doctrine with an incorrect or misleading label.  The
Alaska Supreme Court, however, has consistently attempted to
maintain a doctrinal wall between products liability and negligence
concepts.20
Thus, there are two circumstances where true “strict” liability
is imposed:  (1) for manufacturing defects (where no question
about the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct is usually
raised), and (2) for the liability of distributors and retailers, who
are liable though they had no role in the manufacturing or design
process.  In this manner, the term “strict” has some force.  “Strict”
liability in this context may nevertheless be better described as “vi-
carious” or “derivative” liability because even a retailer or distribu-
tor will not be derivatively liable if the manufacturer is not liable
for selling a defective product.21  On the other hand, if the product
proves defective, all parties in the chain of distribution will face vi-
carious liability, which is in a sense “strict” or “absolute” because
there is no defense, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, for the retailer or seller
once a defect is proven.22  In Alaska, however, the potential liability
of the innocent retailer may be circumscribed by Alaska’s strict
19. See Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transp. Servs., Inc., 928 P.2d 1202, 1204
(Alaska 1996) (finding negligence where party “did not exercise the care and pru-
dence a reasonable person would have exercised under the circumstances”);
Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1201 (Alaska 1992) (discussing “the com-
mon law tort duty to act reasonably under the circumstances”).
20. See infra Part V.
21. See, e.g., City of North Pole v. Zabek, 934 P.2d 1292, 1300 (Alaska 1997)
(“For vicarious liability to attach, some sort of underlying liability must be estab-
lished . . . .”); State v. Will, 807 P.2d 467, 471 (Alaska 1991) (holding that the state
cannot be vicariously liable for negligence through a trooper when the trooper
himself was not negligent); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 760 n.2 (Alaska 1982)
(broker not vicariously liable for acts of employee when trial court found in favor
of employee).
22. The term “strict liability” has been used by courts to describe vicarious or
derivative liability in other contexts, including respondeat superior.  See, e.g.,
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik Constr., Inc., 823 P.2d 632, 638 n.9
(Alaska 1991) (noting that “[c]ommon settings in which tortfeasors are jointly li-
able but not jointly at fault are where one is only liable by operation of vicarious
or strict liability”); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 350 (Alaska
1990) (holding that “this intentional misconduct may fall within the scope of a
therapist’s employment so that it is appropriate to apply the doctrine of ‘respon-
deat superior’ to impose strict liability on his employer”) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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fault allocation statute, mandating monetary liability to be imposed
in strict accordance with actual “fault,”23 as well as the liberal stan-
dards for implied indemnification from the manufacturer to the in-
nocent retailer.  It is therefore an open question today whether the
chain of distribution standards were legislatively impacted when
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080(b)24 was enacted.25
III.  ALASKA PRODUCTS LIABILITY OVERVIEW
Under Alaska law, manufacturers, wholesalers and distribu-
tors, and retail sellers are all subject to products liability.26  Indeed,
products liability in Alaska “applies to any person engaged in the
business of selling products for use or consumption.”27  The doc-
trinal foundation for the Third Restatement rests upon these prin-
ciples,28 thus it is inevitable for Alaska courts to turn to the Third
23. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.90 (LEXIS 1999).  Section 09.17.90 defines “fault”
as including those acts that “subject a person to strict tort liability” for purposes of
allocating liability.  Id.  Under this statute, damages may be imposed only in lock-
step proportion to the defendant’s percentage of fault.  Potentially, the innocent
retailer would have zero percentage of fault, and thus no liability.
24. Id. § 09.17.080(b) (LEXIS 1999) (“In determining the percentages of fault,
the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each person at
fault, and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed.”).  In defining “fault,” the legislature included actions that “subject a
person to strict tort liability.”  Id. § 09.17.080; see also id. § 09.17.060 (“In an action
based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to a person or harm
to property, contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportion-
ately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for the injury attributable to
the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”).
25. See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp. (Lycoming Div.), 850 P.2d 628, 632
(Alaska 1993) ( holding that “the traditional two-step system of first establishing
liability and then seeking contribution is not inconsistent with the comparative
negligence principles underlying the Tort Reform Act” and, therefore, the plain-
tiff’s claim against the primary manufacturer was tried first, and subsequently, the
manufacturer was allowed a separate trial to determine comparative negligence of
other parties for purposes of allocation of fault).  Accordingly, products liability
cases are subject to the allocation of fault statutes.  See id.; see also supra note 23
and accompanying text.
26. See Saddler v. Alaska Marine Lines, Inc., 856 P.2d 784, 787 (Alaska 1993)
(noting that “the following are subject to strict products liability:  sellers, manufac-
turers, wholesale or retail dealers and distributors”) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965)).
27. Id. at 787 n.5 (citing § 402A) (noting that products liability “applies to any
person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption”).
28. The basis for the Third Restatement mirrors Alaska law in breadth in that
the Third Restatement recognizes (1) products liability in tort for defective prod-
ucts (Section 1 of the Third Restatement) and (2) manufacturing defects, design
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Restatement to evaluate both current and future issues.  A princi-
pled approach to evaluating and comparing current law with the
Third Restatement should result in a more rational transition when
an Alaskan court is first faced with the decision of applying the
Third Restatement.
One method for evaluating whether the Third Restatement, or
even any part of it, is appropriate under Alaska law, is to clarify the
purposes and goals underlying current law and compare them to
the aspirations of the Third Restatement.  If the purpose of one re-
flects the result of another, then the transition, if it is to be made,
would not represent a radical departure from current Alaska prod-
ucts liability law.  If there are portions that merely overlap, but do
not coincide completely, then the court reviewing this issue would
weigh the old with the new and make its decision based on the bet-
ter-reasoned public policy.29  For the moment, stare decisis is not a
barrier to such a change because the law is constantly evolving,
with the Third Restatement representing another step in the evolu-
tionary process.  Stare decisis will be further relegated to secondary
status to the extent that the refinements set forth in the Third Re-
statement are not precedent changing so much as precedent devel-
oping and extending.  This is consistent with the approach taken by
the Alaska Supreme Court when faced with the development of
the law in other areas.30
A. Principles of Alaska Products Liability Law
The touchstone for any court considering the Third Restate-
ment is whether its provisions comport with the public policy un-
derlying that court’s existing products liability rationale.  Before
this can be done, the existing principles and public policy must be
defects and warning or instruction defects (Section 2).  It is the details and com-
mentary that depart from Alaska law.
29. See, e.g., Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979) (discussing the balanc-
ing of interests required when competing policies are at issue).  Further, when
weighing competing interests in the products liability arena, the Alaska Supreme
Court will accept or reject a proposed rule of law based on its evaluation of policy
and reason.  See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1198 (Alaska 1992) (re-
jecting an argument for exempting prescription drugs from products liability, rea-
soning that “[n]either policy nor reason supports the approach taken by some
courts in barring such claims”).
30. For example, when the court abandoned the Frye test and adopted the
Daubert test regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, it reasoned that “the
judicial doctrine of stare decisis accords the prior holdings of the highest courts of
this State precedential value while still permitting the reconsideration of legal is-
sues when conditions warrant.”  State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999)
(citing State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n., 895 P.2 947, 953 (Alaska 1995)).
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clarified and examined.  Starting with the first adoption of products
liability in Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center,31 and continuing
through its most recent pronouncements, the Alaska Supreme
Court has identified several policy considerations justifying the
doctrine.  These goals include the following:
(1) ensuring that the social and economic costs incurred by in-
jured consumers are borne by the manufacturers and retail-
ers who profit from these products as opposed to those in-
jured persons who are otherwise “powerless to protect
themselves” from the sometimes “catastrophic losses”32 im-
posed by defective products;33
(2) removing evidentiary barriers that prevented consumers
from obtaining a remedy for injuries that had developed
under negligence and warranty theories;34
(3) allocating the social and economic costs incurred by injured
consumers to all enterprises in the chain of distribution by
imposing vicarious liability on intermediaries and retail sell-
ers who may not have had any active participation in pro-
ducing a defective product;35 and
31. 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
32. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska 1993)
(“The essential public policy on which strict liability is built is the spreading of risk
and ensuring that a manufacturer who is able to absorb loss and spread it is held
liable rather than the consumer for whom loss may be catastrophic.”).
33. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d
1113 (Alaska 1980); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Pratt &
Whitney Can., 852 P.2d at 1176 (“We were persuaded that strict products liability
would ‘insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the in-
jured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.’”) (citing Clary v. Fifth
Ave. Chrysler Ctr., 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969)).
34. See Pratt & Whitney Can., 852 P.2d at 1180 (reaffirming the rejection of
warranty-based theories and noting that “it does not make sense to permit a dis-
claimer of strict liability”); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.
[hereinafter “Butaud II”] 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (this case will be referred to
as Butaud II, since an earlier opinion in the case was handed down the year before
this decision in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209,
213 (Alaska 1975), and will be referred to as Butaud I); Beck I, 593 P.2d at 871.
35. Clary, 454 P.2d at 248 (holding that “[t]he purpose of imposing such strict
liability on the manufacturer and retailer is to insure that the costs of injuries” are
borne by the marketers of such products); Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc.,
925 P.2d 1033 (Alaska 1996) (holding that seller must shoulder some responsibility
for defective products placed into the stream of commerce); Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970) (“[T]he lessor will in most instances be in a better
position than the consumer to prevent circulation of defective products . . . [and]
will generally be able to spread damages and insure against the risk of injuries
stemming from the use of defective products which [sic] he has placed on the mar-
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(4) providing an “incentive for manufacturers to provide safer
products.”36
Above all else, the “concept of risk allocation has been the primary
policy rationale” supporting products liability.37  Although the em-
phasis is to shift the true costs of product injuries to the manufac-
turers and retailers, undoubtedly some or all of these costs may be
shifted back to the consumers in the form of higher product prices.
Presumably, if a product results in enough injuries and liabilities,
the cost for that product will be sufficiently higher than competing
products that are safer.  Therefore, economic market forces may
compel either a safer product or withdrawal of the product for lack
of sales.
The products liability system imposing economic sanctions on
makers of defective products has met considerable success relative
to the goal of providing an “incentive for manufacturers to provide
safer products.”38  Products liability lawsuits result in safer con-
sumer products, such as the following:  (1) more flame resistant
pajamas;39  (2) over-the-counter medications with warnings about
possible drug interactions;40 (3) tampons made with lower absorb-
ency in order to lower the probability of toxic shock;41 (4) removal
of the Dalkon Shield interuterine device;42 (5) removal of artificial
jaw implants; and (6) modifications of breathing and ventilator
medical devices after an adverse verdict.43  Certainly this is one
area of the law that has a direct and important influence in nudging
manufacturers to make safer products where the manufacturers
ket”).  See generally Bernard P. Kelly, Strict Product Liability In Alaska:  A Re-
treat From Enterprise Liability?, 9 U.C.L.A-ALASKA L. REV. 25 (1979).
36. Koehring Mfg. Co. v. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc., 763 P.2d 499, 503
(Alaska 1988).
37. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 877.
38. Koehring Mfg., 763 P.2d at 503.
39. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980) (where
the manufacturer was utilizing a flammable material and, as a result of verdict,
manufacturer utilized flame retardant in manufacturing process).
40. See Steve Bates & Charles W. Hall, Tylenol Verdict Puts Spotlight on Drug
Labels, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 1994, at A1.
41. See O’Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1449-50 (10th
Cir. 1987) (trial court ordered manufacturer to either withdraw fiber from use in
tampons and obtain remittitur on punitive damages or accept imposition of puni-
tive damages; appellate court reinstated punitive damage award although manu-
facturer modified tampon design).
42. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
43. See Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First Nat’l Bank Guardian, 638 S.W.2d 660
(Ark. 1982) (where after the verdict the manufacturer voluntarily issued a medical
device alert in conjunction with the FDA).
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have proven reluctant or unwilling to do so based simply on market
factors.  However, one commentator posited that certain industries,
such as alcohol and tobacco, have been able to mold tort law
around what are otherwise inherently dangerous products:
[I]t is worth considering what it is about our tort-liability system
which has permitted tobacco companies to continue their opera-
tions unabated for the more than forty years that it has been
known that cigarettes make people sick.  Part of the answer . . . is
that tort law has accommodated itself to cigarettes rather than
tobacco companies accommodating to the law.44
Although there may be some industries that have had the
ability to have their products change the law rather than the law
change their products, these appear to be in the minority.  If this
system is working as intended, products that cause harm should be
more expensive than those that do not because the costs of litiga-
tion and verdicts should be included in the market price, thus
spreading these costs onto all consumers instead of imposing all
costs on just the injured consumer.
B. Achieving Efficacy Through Evidentiary Standards
The Alaska courts have developed various evidentiary and le-
gal standards for products liability cases in order to effectuate these
public policy goals.  For instance, a products liability action focuses
on the condition of the product itself, not on the reasonableness of
the conduct,45 decision-making, or marketing of the manufacturer.46
In this manner, the Alaska Supreme court has expressly rejected
the incorporation of any type of negligence terminology into prod-
ucts liability:
44. Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 869 (1998).
45. The reasonableness, or lack thereof, of a defendant’s conduct would be
relevant, however, if there is a claim for punitive damages, which by definition fo-
cuses on the defendant’s conduct and knowledge.  See Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v.
Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979).
46. See Beck I, 593 P.2d at 883 (“The focus of strict products liability is on the
condition of the product, not on the manufacturing and marketing decision of the
defendant.”) (citing Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 325 (Alaska 1970)); see also
Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1352 (Alaska 1991) (“The focus in a
strict product liability case is on the product, not on the conduct of the defen-
dant.”).  The Alaska Supreme Court has admonished the trial courts that jury in-
structions in products liability cases should avoid negligence concepts and negli-
gence language by eliminating references to a defendant’s reasonableness.  See
Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199-200 (Alaska 1992); Patricia R. v. Sulli-
van, 631 P.2d 91, 102-03 (Alaska 1981) (reversing verdict because of negligence
language in jury instructions); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604
P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Alaska 1979).
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In the Beck [I] case, we expressly rejected the approach taken by
some legal commentators of reinserting negligence terminology
into the jury’s inquiry into the “diverse factors related to the
product’s desirability and to its dangerousness,” which is the cru-
cial analysis in the jury’s overall determination that a product’s
design is defective and the manufacturer should bear legal re-
sponsibility for the mistake.  We emphasized there that “[t]he
focus of strict products liability is on the condition of the prod-
uct, not on the manufacturing and marketing decision of the de-
fendant.”47
Moreover, liability will be imposed if a design is dangerous to a
consumer, notwithstanding the fact that the design conforms to in-
dustry standards or practices.48  Additionally, the manufacturer is
obligated to design a product that considers not only the intended
use of the product, but any reasonably foreseeable product use.49
Another method chosen by the court for fulfilling the policies
underlying products liability is to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant once a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case.50  For ex-
ample, once a plaintiff establishes a defect by submitting evidence
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used as intended, or establishes a prima
facie case that product design features were a proximate cause of
the injury, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant who then has
the obligation to offer evidence under a risk-benefit analysis or re-
fute the plaintiff’s theory of causation.51  The court has consistently
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, including the imposi-
47. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1062 (footnotes omitted).
48. See Beck I, 593 P.2d at 886 (noting that it is no defense even if “‘the manu-
facturer took reasonable precautions in an attempt to design a safe product or
otherwise acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer’”) (quoting Barker v. Lull
Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978)).
49. See id.  Here again, however, the risk of commingling and confusing negli-
gence concepts with products liability concepts emerges.  For example, in deter-
mining whether a particular use was “foreseeable,” the focus is on what was fore-
seeable to the manufacturer, not the consumer, which will necessarily involve
objective proof of what a reasonable manufacturer would have, or should have,
known — a negligence principle.  See Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d
369, 373 (Alaska 1983); Lamer v. McKee Indus., Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska
1986).
50. See Beck I, 593 P.2d 885 (“‘[A] manufacturer who seeks to escape liability
for an injury proximately caused by the product’s design on a risk-benefit theory
should bear the burden of persuading the trier of fact that its product should not
be judged defective, the defendant’s burden is one affecting the burden of proof,
rather than simply the burden of producing evidence.’” (quoting Barker, 573 P.2d
at 455)).
51. See Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 406 (Alaska 1985).
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tion upon the defendant to prove that the consumer’s injuries in a
motor vehicle accident were not enhanced by a defective safety
product.52  Further, evidence of subsequent remedial measures are
admissible against the defendant to prove both design defect and
feasibility of alternative designs.53  Notably, evidence of compliance
with the “state of the art” may not be used as a shield for defense,
but evidence of noncompliance with the “state of the art” is admis-
sible as a sword to establish a defect.54  Similarly, it is no defense for
a manufacturer to claim that a certain industry safety code was not
adopted in the particular state where the manufacturing took
52. See General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska
1998) (“We agree with Farnsworth that it should be the proven wrongdoer who
must bear the burden of limiting its liability; it would be unfair to require a plain-
tiff who has already proved that a defect was a substantial factor in causing his or
her injuries to try another case based upon what might have happened absent the
defect.  Thus, we conclude that [the jury instruction] accurately stated the law of
apportionment by placing the burden of apportioning injury on the defendant.”).
53. See Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 411; see also FED. R. EVID. 407; Beck II, 624
P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981) (“We therefore hold that evidence of post-injury ac-
cidents and design changes is admissible.”).
54. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979); see also
Beck I, 593 P.2d at 881 (jury may consider what other manufacturers were pro-
ducing and designing to the extent evidence establishes feasibility of alternative
design).  The Beck I court reasoned, however, that a defendant could utilize feasi-
bility evidence to help establish lack of feasibility of the alternative design.  593
P.2d at 886 (discussing the defendant’s obligation to prove “the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, [and] the financial cost of an improved de-
sign”).  Also, although “state of the art” is not a defense, a related concept of “sci-
entific knowability” is a defense, wherein the manufacturer may be allowed to
present evidence that the harm complained of was not scientifically knowable
when the product was made.  See Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1063 (“In Beck [I] we held
that the defendant in a strict liability case may prove that the product was not de-
fective by introducing evidence showing the various trade-offs in the design proc-
ess.  We stated there that the fact-finder is required ‘to consider and compare a
number of competing factors, including but not limited to ‘ . . . the mechanical fea-
sibility of a safer alternative design . . . .’  A determination of the ‘scientific know-
ability’ of the unsafe character of the product is relevant to the above inquiry in
that it underlies evaluation of the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the harmful
aspects of the product.”).  The court reasoned that where no indication of danger
existed prior to the injury, a manufacturer would have no basis for concluding that
the product should not be marketed as designed.  See id.
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place.55  In this regard, the court rejected the Second Restatement’s
contrary provision.56
Another example lies in defective warning cases:  In Alaska, if
the most stringent warning possible fails to protect the public, the
defect itself (i.e., the problem giving rise to the warning), must be
eliminated in order for the manufacturer to avoid liability.57  Fi-
nally, as a means to ensure that the innocent consumer is compen-
sated for all losses, vicarious liability is imposed upon “innocent”58
retailers and sellers,59 with an implied right of indemnity from the
culpable manufacturer.60  The following has been deemed an “accu-
rate summary”61 of the innocent retailer’s implied right to indem-
nity:
55. See Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 410.  The court reasoned that public policy re-
quires a manufacturer to meet the highest safety standards in effect, irrespective
or whether a particular jurisdiction had adopted such standards into law.  See id.
56. See id.  The court rejected section 288A(2)(b) from the Second Restate-
ment, which allowed ignorance of a national safety standard as a defense if the ju-
risdiction where the product was made did not adopt that standard.  See id.
Alaska law thus requires a manufacturer to comply with the highest safety stan-
dards known at the time of manufacture.
57. See Sturm, 594 P.2d at 44 (“Where the most stringent warning does not
protect the public, the defect itself must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to
avoid liability.”).
58. “Innocent” in the sense that these entities played no role in the design and
manufacturing, but are culpable as a matter of public policy for participating in
the marketing and profit-making enterprise as a whole.
59. See Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc., 925 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Alaska
1996) (“Courts have long recognized that a seller must shoulder some responsibil-
ity for the costs imposed by defective or dangerous products.”).
60. The imposition of vicarious products liability upon retailers, distributors
and sellers does not extend to one who simply repairs a defective product.
Rather, if there is a faulty repair, the claim against the repairer will sound in negli-
gence, not products liability.  See Kodiak Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. DeLaval Turbine,
Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 154 (Alaska 1984) (“Kodiak Electric cannot prevail, however,
on its strict liability claim against Westinghouse.  Westinghouse did not manufac-
ture generator Unit 10 . . . .  All that Westinghouse provided was repair service.”);
Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113,
1117 (Alaska 1980) (citation omitted) (“Arguably, a business that sells used prod-
ucts, like the manufacturer and the original retailer, ‘put(s) such products on the
market.’  A repairer does not.”).  These holdings were foreshadowed by the
court’s dicta in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833,
839 n.21 (Alaska 1967), where the court first broached strict liability theory and
reasoned that it did “not believe that policy considerations justify extension of
strict liability to one rendering boiler repair services.”  See id.
61. Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chemical Co., 904 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska
1995).
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The general rule of implied indemnity in Alaska is that an inno-
cent supplier of a defective product who is liable on a theory of
strict liability is entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer of
the defective product.62  Even if no liability is found, the innocent
supplier may nonetheless be entitled to indemnity from the
manufacturer for the attorney’s fees and costs in defending the
action.63  A supplier entitled to indemnity may be a retailer, a
lessor, or even a manufacturer who incorporates an already de-
fective component part into its product.64
Importantly, however, a party who is “independently negligent is
completely barred from recovery under the theory of implied in-
demnity.”65  This is simply another way of saying that if a retailer or
distributor is not truly “innocent” then indemnity from the manu-
facturer will not be available.
These evidentiary and substantive standards were adopted,
and justifiable, under the rubric established by the four policy for-
mulations set forth above.  Accordingly, the evidentiary and sub-
stantive standards set forth in the Third Restatement should be
evaluated in light of these policies and with the understanding that
no Third Restatement provision that contradicts these policies
should be adopted unless and until the pertinent policy is jettisoned
or has lost its efficacy.
C. The Development of Alaska Products Liability Law and
Partial Adoption of the Second Restatement
1. The Standards for Products Liability.  In order to compare
the Third Restatement with existing Alaska law, several of the
more important decisions on products liability must be set forth.
The seminal products liability case in Alaska is Clary v. Fifth
Avenue Chrysler Center.66  In Clary, the court reasoned that a car
dealer could be “strictly” liable in tort for a consumer’s claim of
62. See Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Alaska 1986); D.G. Shelter
Prods. Co. v. Moduline Indus., Inc., 684 P.2d 839, 841 (Alaska 1984).
63. See Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska
1979).
64. See Ross Labs., 725 P.2d at 1081 (retailer); Koehring Mfg. Co. v. Earth-
movers of Fairbanks, Inc., 763 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1988) (lessor); D.G. Shelter
Prods., 684 P.2d at 840 (manufacturer).
65. Palmer, 904 P.2d at 1225 (citing Koehring Mfg., 763 P.2d at 504); Ross
Laboratories, 725 P.2d at 1081; Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 661 P.2d
619, 626 (Alaska 1983).
66. 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); see also Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Shee-
han, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993) (“Alaska strict products liability precedent
begins with Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr. . . . .”).
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hypoxia arising out of a carbon monoxide leak into the car.67  The
court rejected the warranty theory of liability, along with its privity
defense, and adopted a “strict” liability scheme because it provided
the “most logical, least technical, and most comprehensive” means
for achieving the goal of insuring that “the cost of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers.”68  The
reasoning set forth in Clary maintains its force today and has not
been questioned by subsequent decisions; rather, its holding has
been expounded upon and broadened.69  Clary holds that the
plaintiff need only prove that a manufacturer or retailer places “on
the market” a product that “proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being.”70
Importantly, the court in Clary rejected the Second Restate-
ment’s products liability formulation set forth in section 402A.71
Instead, the court chose the approach taken by the California Su-
preme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,72 finding it
to be the least technical and “most comprehensive.”73  The Green-
man approach, which is still followed in Alaska,74 provides that “[a]
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for de-
fects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing.”75  The rejection of the section 402A approach was reaffirmed
in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. (“Butaud
I”)76 reiterating that “this court will follow the view taken by the
California Supreme Court in Greenman.”77
By rejecting the Second Restatement’s section 402A, the court
in Clary unmistakably intended to create a products liability
scheme that benefited the consumer by not just eliminating privity
(as accomplished in section 402A(2)(b)), but by crafting a low
threshold standard of proof, namely, proof of (1) a defect that (2)
67. 454 P.2d at 245.
68. Id. at 248.
69. See Pratt & Whitney Can., 852 P.2d at 1177 (“Essentially for the policy rea-
sons identified in Clary, we extended strict liability beyond the narrow ‘personal
injury’ reading in New Moon.”); Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (“[W]e intend no retreat
from our holdings in Clary.”).
70. 454 P.2d at 245.
71. Id. at 247-48.
72. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
73. Clary, 454 P.2d at 248.
74. See Pratt & Whitney Can., 852 P.2d at 1176 (discussing Greenman and its
application in Alaska products liability law).
75. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.
76. 543 P.2d 209, 213 (Alaska 1975).
77. Id.
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caused an injury.78  The Clary court did not explain what “defect”
meant.79  As one court reasoned, “[c]ritical, then, to the disposition
of products liability claims is the meaning of ‘defect.’  The term is
not self-defining and has no accepted meaning suitable for all strict
liability cases.”80  In Clary, however, it was apparent that a vehicle’s
heating system should not allow carbon monoxide into the passen-
ger compartment, based on expert testimony and a comparison
with other cars.81  Since the car at issue in Clary allowed carbon
monoxide to enter into the passenger compartment, the jury was
allowed to conclude that it was in fact defective.82  Thus, the con-
sumer’s hypoxia, resulting from a faulty heating system, would be
actionable and sufficient, without more proof, to impose liability.83
This same reasoning was applied as a matter of law in Bachner v.
Pearson84 involving another faulty heating system, this time in an
airplane instead of in a car.85
Butaud I86 is significant because it represents the first concrete
expression that the Alaska courts would not require the plaintiff to
prove that a product was “unreasonably dangerous” in addition to
being defective, despite the contrary requirements of the Second
78. 454 P.2d at 245-48.
79. Id.
80. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983).
81. 454 P.2d at 249-50 (discussing expert testimony regarding the design of
heating systems).
82. Id. at 245-48.
83. See id.; see also Gary Ableser, Products Liability—From Warranty to Strict
Liability:  Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center and Pearson v. Bachner, 1
U.C.L.A-ALASKA L. REV. 105 (1972); Kelly, supra note 35, at 25-26 (construing
Clary, noting that “[f]or enterprise liability to exist under a strict products liability
theory, the injured plaintiff need only prove that a product is defective and that
the defect proximately caused the injury”).  Kelly posited that the Alaska Su-
preme Court’s allowance of comparative negligence defenses in products liability
actions undercut the enterprise theory and loss allocation purposes of products
liability and unduly interjected negligence principles.  But a review of Clary re-
veals that the plaintiff offered evidence of other vehicle designs, a comparison that
establishes defect by showing a breach of industry standards and, in a sense, a
breach of reasonable conduct.  Certainly if absolute liability were the rule, com-
parative negligence principles would be doctrinally anathema.  As absolute liabil-
ity is not the rule, comparative negligence principles are not inherently contradic-
tory to products liability analysis.
84. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
85. Id. at 327.  Notably, strict liability was imposed as a matter of law on ap-
peal, based on the undisputed facts.  Another notable finding is that there is no
significant legal difference in applying products liability theory to products that
were leased instead of sold.
86. 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
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Restatement section 402A.87  This is extremely important in evalu-
ating the Third Restatement, because the Third Restatement car-
ries this dual-pronged requirement forward from the Second Re-
statement.  The Butaud I court explained its holding in Clary,88
rejecting the unreasonably dangerous requirement, and reasoned
that under Greenman,89 the plaintiff need only prove “that the
product is defective and the defect is the proximate cause of the
injuries.” 90  In Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co.,91 the court noted
that in Clary it had “adopted the simpler approach of Greenman
over the Restatement approach” but adopted the Second Restate-
ment to the extent it recognized “the similarity between suits for
physical injury and direct property damage.”92
Following the establishment of products liability law in Alaska
in Clary,93 the court’s decision in Beck I94 represents the next major
development, and remains the cornerstone of Alaska products li-
ability law.  While the court in Clary did not expound on the basis
for liability, such as design defect or manufacturing defect, Beck I
represents the first clear delineation of these theories in Alaska
law.  In Beck I, the operator of a loader was crushed to death when
the loader rolled over an embankment.95  The estate claimed that
the loader was defectively designed because the manufacturer
failed to install a protective roll bar.96  The Beck I court adopted
the test established by the California Supreme Court in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.,97 which provided that the factfinder can find
a product defective either
87. Id. at 213-14.
88. Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
89. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).  The Bu-
taud I court reasoned that a plaintiff “need not prove that the defect made the
product ‘unreasonably dangerous’ to the user or consumer.  [H]aving to prove the
element of ‘unreasonably dangerous’ as required by the Restatement places an
added burden on the plaintiff not consonant with Greenman.”  Butaud I, 543 P.2d
at 214 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Cal. 1972)).  The
court cited California law approvingly, reasoning that requiring proof of unrea-
sonable danger “represents a step backwards in the development of products li-
ability cases.”  Id.
90. Butaud I, 543 P.2d at 213.
91. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
92. Id. at 251 & n.6.
93. 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
94. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
95. Id. at 874.
96. See id.
97. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner [consumer expectation
test] . . . or if the plaintiff proves that the product’s design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design [risk-bene-
fit test].98
Once the plaintiff has established either of these standards, the
manufacturer must then demonstrate that on balance the benefits
of the existing design outweigh the risk of danger associated with
that design.99  The Barker test represents an important adaptation
of Alaska law because it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant
to prove that the benefits outweigh the risks, and that “burden is
one affecting the burden of proof, rather than simply the burden of
producing evidence.”100  The manufacturer’s burden of risk-utility
balancing remains the operative test for establishing design de-
fect,101 although the consumer expectation test may apply in situa-
tions where the risk-utility test does not and vice-versa.102  Beck I
takes on added importance in light of the Third Restatement’s re-
jection of the consumer expectation test that was first recognized in
Alaska in that case.103  As more fully discussed below, this part of
Beck I will have to be reevaluated before the court can completely
adopt the Third Restatement’s approach.
2. Defective Warnings or Instructions.  The decision in Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day was the first Alaska opinion focusing on
warning defects.104   In Sturm the plaintiff was injured when he
dropped his sidearm and it accidentally fired.105  He claimed that
the sidearm was defective in “that the hammer had been on the
loading notch” and thus should not have been capable of firing
when it improperly fired, notwithstanding a warning in the owner’s
manual regarding the possibility of the gun firing when the hammer
98. Id. at 457-58.  See also General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209,
1220 (Alaska 1998).
99. See Beck I, 593 P.2d at 885-86.
100. Id. at 885 (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 455).
101. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992) (discussing
the Barker test as it applies to prescription drugs).
102. See id. at 1194-95.
103. 593 P.2d 871, 882-83 (Alaska 1979).
104. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).  The court in Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d
396, 405 & n.5 (Alaska 1985), overruled Sturm to the extent that Sturm held that
failure to exercise ordinary care could give rise to a comparative negligence de-
fense based on strict liability.
105. 594 P.2d at 41.
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was in the loading notch.106  Importantly, the Sturm court held that
a company could still be liable for defective warning even if the
danger resulting from a product was obvious or hidden, or even if a
stringent warning was provided pointing out the danger.107  Rather,
“[w]here the most stringent warning does not protect the public,
the defect itself must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to avoid
liability.”108  Sturm also established that punitive damages are
available in products liability cases where the “manufacturer knew
that its product was defectively designed and that injuries and
deaths had resulted from the design defect, but continued to
market the product in reckless disregard of the public’s safety.”109
Establishing product defect through inadequate warnings was
extended in Prince v. Parachutes, Inc.,110 where the court held that
even if the product is designed and manufactured without a defect,
inadequate use instructions or warnings can constitute a defect
resulting in liability.111  Further, in determining whether the
consumer had or should have had knowledge of the defect, the
court adopted an objective standard of whether an “ordinary user”
would have known of the product risk — not whether that
particular plaintiff in fact knew of the potential risk.112  The
plaintiff’s awareness of the potential risk is not relevant as a
defense to the duty to warn,113 although it is relevant to
comparative negligence for “voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger.”114  A plaintiff can
establish a breach of a duty to warn, and thus impose liability on
the manufacturer, irrespective of the plaintiff’s actual knowledge or
conduct.  In allocating fault for damages, however, the jury can
weigh the plaintiff’s knowledge or conduct.115
106. Id.
107. Id. at 44.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 47
110. 685 P.2d 83 (Alaska 1984).  In Prince, the plaintiff, a novice parachute en-
thusiast, was injured while using a parachute intended for more experienced prac-
titioners.  Id. at 85-86.
111. Id. at 89-90.
112. See id. at 88 (“On the issue of duty to warn, however, the question to be
put to the jury is whether ‘the danger, or potentially [sic] of danger, is generally
known and recognized” (quoting Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d
809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974))).
113. See Prince, 685 P.2d at 89.
114. Id.
115. See id.
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In Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,116 the court set forth three criteria for
manufacturers to satisfy in order to adequately warn consumers.117
To be adequate, the warning should “(1) clearly indicate the scope
of the risk or danger posed by the product; (2) reasonably commu-
nicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that could result from
the risk of danger; and (3) be conveyed in such a manner as to alert
the reasonably prudent person.”118  Nothing in Shanks retreated
from the court’s holding in Sturm, that, notwithstanding compli-
ance with all three of these criteria, a manufacturer may still be li-
able “where the most stringent warning does not protect the pub-
lic,” in which case “the defect itself must be eliminated if the
manufacturer is to avoid liability.”119
3. Medical Devices and Prescription Drugs.  Shanks v.
Upjohn Co.120 represents the next major step in Alaska products
liability law, particularly with respect to the Second Restatement.
In Shanks, the estate of a deceased patient claimed that a
prescription medication caused the patient to commit suicide.121  As
discussed above, the court applied a modified consumer
expectation test and held that liability could be imposed if the drug
did not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary
physician.122  Taking issue with the approach of the California
Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Ct.,123 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the risk-benefit test adopted in Beck I124 would
apply to design defect claims involving prescription medications.125
Notably, the Second Restatement, comment k, addressed this issue
and recommended that no liability be imposed against drug
manufacturers “merely because [they have] undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.”126  The
Alaska Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach, and
directed the trier of fact to weigh both the risks and benefits of
116. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
117. See id. at 1200.
118. Id.
119. Sturm, 594 P.2d at 44.
120. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
121. See id. at 1192.
122. See id. at 1195.
123. 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988).  The Shanks court found the reasoning in
Brown “unpersuasive.” 835 P.2d at 1195.
124. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
125. See Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1196.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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vaccines and medications.127  Where the risks outweigh the benefits,
the product will be deemed defective.
The Shanks court’s rejection of comment k128 and its applica-
tion of the Barker test regarding risk-utility129 marked the third in-
stance130 where the Alaska Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Second Restatement approach in favor of its own formulation.
This judicial independence and critical thinking warrants a closer
examination of the Third Restatement, since many of the Second
Restatement principles were carried forward.  This is particularly
true since comment k from the Second Restatement was not just
reincorporated into the Third Restatement, but was given its own
separate chapter.131  Shanks also exemplifies the court’s use of the
general principles giving rise to products liability132 as its touchstone
when evaluating a claimed defense or immunity.133
4. The Recognition of Affirmative Defenses.  The
development and adoption of the theory for products liability
created the necessary groundwork for the development of certain
affirmative defenses.  Bachner v. Pearson134 established that
comparative negligence was not a defense to a products liability
claim unless “the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably
encounter[ed] a known risk.”135  The standard for comparative
negligence in a strict liability tort requires a “voluntary assumption
127. See Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1197.
128. See id. at 1197-98 (“[W]e find it undesirable and unnecessary to impose an
additional layer of comment k on an area of law which is already strained under its
own doctrinal weight.”).
129. See id. at 1198.
130. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Alaska
1969) (rejecting the Second Restatement’s “strict tort liability” in favor of the ap-
proach of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1969),
finding it the “most logical, least technical and most comprehensive”); Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 543 P.2d 209, 213-14 (Alaska 1975) (reject-
ing the Second Restatement’s “unreasonably dangerous” standard).
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS.  LIAB. § 6 (1998) (ex-
panding upon the separate treatment afforded manufacturers of prescription
drugs and medical devices that originated with comment k).
132. See supra Part III.A.
133. 835 P.2d at 1197-98.  The court extensively discusses both the comment to
the Second Restatement and the decisions of other jurisdictions following com-
ment k.  The court compares each defense raised with the overall purpose of
products liability law as set forth in Clary and Beck I, and ultimately rejects these
arguments on that basis.
134. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
135. Id. at 329-30.
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of a known risk.”136  This standard, set forth in the Second
Restatement section 402A, comment n, was confirmed in Butaud
I,137 where the court clarified that the “defense does not arise unless
the plaintiff is aware of the defect and danger and still proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product.”138  One year later, the
court expanded this defense to include plaintiff misuse of the
product as a defense.139  The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the
Butaud I reasoning, and thereby comment n of section 402A, in
Dura Corp. v. Harned.140
Until recently, the comparative negligence defense generally
did not apply in design defect cases where the defect was a lack of
safety devices,141 rendering the Butaud I defense of a knowing use
of a defective product unavailable.142  This rule, however, was un-
dercut by the court in General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth,143 where
the court addressed whether the defense of comparative negligence
by product misuse could be asserted against a plaintiff who claimed
the safety restraint system in her car was defective.  The court held
that it could, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that product misuse
was not a defense relative to safety products.144  Based on the rul-
ings up to that point, it would appear that the trial court was ar-
guably correct in its conclusion that comparative negligence should
not be available in this context, although the Alaska Supreme
136. Id. at 330 n.24.
137. 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
138. Id. at 212.
139. See Butaud II, 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976) (“The defense of comparative
negligence is [no longer] limited to those cases where the plaintiff uses the product
with knowledge of the defective condition, but also extends to those cases where
the plaintiff misuses the product and that misuse is a proximate cause of his inju-
ries.”).
140. 703 P.2d 396, 404 & n.2 (Alaska 1985).  Importantly, although this is a de-
fense for purposes of comparative negligence, it is not a complete bar to recovery.
Thus, to the extent comment n concludes that this defense, if proven, is a bar to
recovery, Alaska law rejects that conclusion.
141. See Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 892 (Alaska 1979).
142. See Beck II, 624 P.2d 790, 795 (Alaska 1981).  “In Beck I, we held that:
‘when the design defect is the lack of a safety device, the jury may be instructed
that the plaintiff may be comparatively negligent in the knowing use of a defective
product only if he voluntarily and unreasonably encounters the known risk.’”  Id.
at 593 n.10 (quoting Beck I, 593 P.2d at 892); see also Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 404
(affirming standard requiring proof of the consumer’s actual knowledge of the
product’s defect (including the lack of a safety device) and proof that the con-
sumer voluntarily used the product and unreasonably encountered a known risk).
143. 965 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Alaska 1998).
144. See id.
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Court disagreed.  Now, comparative negligence can be asserted as
a defense in any type of products liability action where the plaintiff
misuses the product, even those involving safety devices.145  While
perhaps inconsistent with true products liability principles, this ap-
proach is consistent with true allocation of fault principles and
other tort goals, including the principle that “[t]ort law seeks to de-
ter future behavior that exposes others to injury.”146
145. See id.  The decision in Farnsworth glosses over the impact that allocation
of fault may have in the context of safety products and crashworthiness cases.  The
court held that the “original tortfeasor” in a car accident is the person who drove
negligently.  Id. at 1217.  Thus, it reasoned, the driver of the other vehicle is “liable
as a matter of law” for the plaintiff’s injuries, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s claim
that a defect in the vehicle’s safety features failed to prevent the harm.  Id.  While
the court left it open for the jury to determine the actual percentage of fault to be
allocated to the original tortfeasor (but noted that at least 1% must be allocated as
a matter of law), the practical effect will likely be a complete or majority alloca-
tion of fault to the original tortfeasor.  When faced with a defective seat belt,
brake system or airbag, versus a drunk driver (or a driver impaired by cocaine, as
in Farnsworth), it would not be unreasonable for a jury to assign virtually all fault
to the impaired third party driver.  In this manner, a manufacturer of a defective
product could essentially obtain immunity from any significant damage award.  By
allowing the harm caused by defective safety products to be reduced or offset
completely, this decision overlooks the controlling purpose of products liability
law:  making products safer and allocating risks from the innocent consumer to
those who profit from the product.  It further glosses over the fact that vehicle
safety features assume by their very existence that a driver will act negligently,
thus causing an accident.  Accordingly, in all but the most bizarre incidents, where
a vehicle safety feature proves to be defective in that it fails to perform as an ordi-
nary consumer would expect or fails when compared to the benefits of an alterna-
tive design, there may still be no liability for the resulting harm since the “original
tortfeasor,” i.e., whoever is the negligent driver, is liable as a matter of law.  To
this extent, the result of Farnsworth does not promote the stated goals and princi-
ples of products liability.  This reasoning elevates comparative allocation of fault
principles above products liability principles.  Since this aspect of Farnsworth is
inconsistent with its prior reasoning, the court’s change in emphasis is most likely
due to legislative changes, particularly the modification of Alaska Statutes section
09.17.080, Alaska’s comparative fault statute.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080—
09.17.900 (LEXIS 1998) (stating that “‘fault’ includes acts or omissions that are in
any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional toward the person or property of
the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability”); see also
Fancyboy v. Alaska Village Elec. Coop., Inc., 984 P.2d 1128, 1132-33 (Alaska
1999) (finding that this statute “expressly instructs a court or jury to apportion
fault to each party liable on the basis of several liability” and that fault is defined
to include products liability).  Literal application of this statute would achieve the
result reached in Farnsworth.
146. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1218.
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In Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc.,147 the court rec-
ognized a third defense, that of scientific knowability.148  If the
harm that occurred was the result of a defect that could  be cor-
rected only by information not “scientifically knowable” at the
time the product was marketed, no liability will be imposed.149  Yet
another defense, in rare circumstances, is that of a superseding
cause for the harm in a products liability claim.150  This defense may
rarely apply because, by definition, it is available only where there
is evidence that the incident that caused the harm was “highly ex-
traordinary”151 in that it would not have happened without “the act
of a third person or other force.”152  Where an intervening cause is
foreseeable, it is not a “superseding cause” and the defense is not
available.153  In warning cases, a claim that the cost of a warning
outweighs the benefits is no defense, since the “cost of giving an
adequate warning is usually so minimal.”154  In a defective warning
claim, where a dangerous or defective condition is “open and obvi-
ous,” the manufacturer may have a defense,155 e.g., knives tend to
be sharp, and no warning should be required pointing that out.
Lastly, the manufacturer can defeat liability by asserting that a con-
sumer “substantially altered” the product, if that alteration caused
the injury.156
147. 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979).
148. Id. at 1063-64.
149. See id. at 1063 (defining “scientific knowability” as “where no indication of
danger exists and no techniques for obtaining such information are available”).
150. See Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 402-03.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
152. Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 402 (quoting Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660
P.2d 428, 433 n.4 (Alaska 1983)).
153. Id.
154. Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986).
155. Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984) (discussing a de-
fense to strict liability based upon failure to warn of “hazards or dangers that
would be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product”) (citing Patricia
R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981)).  While the “open and obvious”
danger may be a defense regarding the duty to warn, design issues may be prob-
lematic for the manufacturer of a patently dangerous product.  In design defect
cases, the “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have held that the open and
obvious nature of the danger does not preclude liability for design defects.”
Ogletree v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570, 571-72 (Ga. 1998).  The
Third Restatement rejects the “open and obvious” defense in design cases.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. d (1998).  The more
open and obvious the danger, the more one might expect a design to ameliorate
that danger.
156. Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 372 (Alaska 1983).
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The foregoing are the currently recognized affirmative de-
fenses to a products liability claim.  Of course, a manufacturer can
always defend on the basis that its product was not manufactured
defectively, that its warning was adequate, or argue that the bene-
fits of a product design outweigh its risks, in addition to any causa-
tion defense.
IV.  A COMPARISON OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT WITH EXISTING ALASKA LAW
Early indications are that the Alaska courts will turn to the
Third Restatement for guidance just as they did with the Second
Restatement.  For instance, the supreme court has discussed the
Third Restatement section 16, comment a, relative to a “crashwor-
thiness” claim.157  Since there are several substantive discrepancies
between some of the Third Restatement’s provisions and Alaska
law, each Third Restatement provision must be closely scrutinized
before it is applied or adopted.  Before doing so, a brief synopsis of
the structure of the Third Restatement is necessary.
Unlike the Second Restatement’s section 402A, the Third Re-
statement expressly categorizes the types of product defect theories
into three distinct areas:  (1) manufacturing defect, (2) design de-
fect, and (3) inadequate warning or instruction defect.158  In so do-
ing, the Third Restatement section 2(a)–(c) complies with existing
Alaska law.  For example, the court in Beck explained that
[p]roducts may be defective for at least three reasons:
1.  Flawed fabrication or construction (i.e., deviating from the
condition intended by the manufacturer),
2.  Improper design (i.e., conforming to the design intended by
the manufacturer but producing unacceptable consequences),
and
3.  Misinformation or inadequate information about risks in-
volved in using the product or about minimizing or avoiding
harm from such risks.159
Thus, from a global perspective, the Third Restatement and Alaska
law rest on the same foundation.  The discrepancies arise in the ap-
plication of these principles.
157. See General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1212 & n.1
(Alaska 1998); see also infra notes 260-269 and accompanying text.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a)–(c) (1998).
159. Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 878 n.15 (Alaska 1979); see also Shanks v. Upjohn
Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992) (“A product may be defective because of a
manufacturing defect, a defective design, or a failure to contain adequate warn-
ings.”).
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One of the more controversial modifications set forth in the
Third Restatement is the complete rejection of the consumer ex-
pectation test in favor of the risk-benefit test, including the re-
quirement that the plaintiff present evidence of a reasonable alter-
native design when alleging defective design under this test.160  This
requirement, and the abandonment of the consumer expectation
test, is inconsistent with Alaska law.
Under Alaska law since Beck I, the fact-finder can find a
product defective either
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner [the consumer expec-
tation test] . . . or if the plaintiff proves that the product’s design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design [the risk-
benefit test].161
Thus, Alaska law utilizes either the consumer expectation test or
the risk-benefit test for proving design defect.  To the extent the
Third Restatement section 2(b), does not recognize the consumer
expectation test,162 it is inconsistent with Alaska law.163  The Alaska
Supreme Court has affirmed the utility of the consumer expecta-
tion test in Alaska, and no new factors have appeared that the
court did not already consider and that would merit a departure
from its previous analysis.164  Since Alaska law still recognizes the
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
161. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1220  (quoting Beck I, 593 P.2d at 884) (emphasis
added).
162. The Third Restatement Reporters note that “a small core of scholars have
supported the consumer expectation test over the years, [but] a far greater num-
ber of scholars have sharply criticized the test as an independent general standard
for design defect.”  James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consen-
sus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 904 (1998).
163. Section 2(a) of the Third Restatement recognizes the consumer expecta-
tion test only for manufacturing defects, whereas Alaska law recognizes the con-
sumer expectation test for design and manufacturing defect cases as well.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmts. c & g (1998).
164. See Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1209 (justifying the current utility of the con-
sumer expectation test).  The court explained:
We agree with the California Supreme Court that consumers can
form reasonable and educated expectations about how certain products
should perform.  See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310
(Cal. 1994) (stating “we cannot accept GM’s insinuation that ordinary
consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the minimum safety of
the products they use.  In particular circumstances, a product’s design
may perform so unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common rea-
son, experience, and understanding of its ordinary consumers.”). . . .
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consumer expectation test, adoption of the Third Restatement sec-
tion 2(b) should be accompanied by the caveat that this section
only partially reflects Alaska law.
The risk-benefit test, set forth as the sole test under section
2(b) of the Third Restatement, was the subject of substantial de-
bate regarding whether the test required a plaintiff to prove the
feasibility of a reasonable alternative design.165  Unlike the Third
Restatement, under Alaska law the availability of a reasonable al-
ternative design does not dispose of the case.  Rather, it is only one
factor for the jury to consider:
we stated in Beck that the fact finder must consider competing
factors, including but not limited to
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged
design, the likelihood that such danger would occur,
the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design,
the financial cost of an improved design, and the ad-
verse consequences to the product and to the con-
sumer that would result from an alternative design.166
The Third Restatement, in contrast to Alaska law, elevates the
safer alternative design factor, with some exceptions,167 as the sine
qua non for product design defect.168  Perhaps more importantly,
the Third Restatement places the burden of proof on the plaintiff
to establish a safer alternative design, whereas Alaska law requires
only that the plaintiff prove that the design caused the injury.169
Once the plaintiff’s burden is satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant, requiring the trier of fact to decide “whether a de-
fendant has met the burden of proving that the benefits of the de-
sign outweigh the risk.”170  This fairly dramatic difference between
In addition, our initial reasons for adopting the consumer expectation
test are sound.  In Beck [I], we adopted the test as part of Alaska’s prod-
uct liability law partly because it “incorporates notions of the implied
warranty of fitness for reasonable use, a primary concept in the evolution
of strict products liability. . . .”  The “implied warranty of fitness or mer-
chantability requires that goods ‘be fit for the ordinary purposes for
which the goods are used.’”
Id. at 1221 (internal citation omitted).
165. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 162.
166. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Alaska 1992) (quoting Beck I,
593 P.2d at 886) (emphasis added).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998) (recog-
nizing that a product design that reflects a high risk of injury combined with low
social utility can be found defective even without any alternative design proof pre-
sented).
168. Id.
169. See Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1194.
170. Id. at 1196.
VANFLEIN.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:12 AM
2000] PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN ALASKA 29
Alaska law and the Third Restatement traces its origins to the
public policy standards identified above,171 alleviating the plaintiff
from having to prove “fault” and placing the onus on the manufac-
turer to produce “the relevant complex and technical evidence”
since the manufacturer “has the most access to and is the most fa-
miliar with such evidence.”172  Further, the Third Restatement ap-
proach glosses over the separate risk-utility test embraced in
Alaska,173 where “the product satisfies ordinary consumer expecta-
tions as to its general use but is still ‘defective’ in that its design ex-
poses the user or bystander to ‘excessive preventable danger.’”174
The Third Restatement does not appear to recognize this formula-
tion of the risk-utility test and would be at odds with Alaska law in
this respect.
Even under Alaska law, however, the process of weighing the
risks and benefits of the design in question or establishing that the
design in question exposes the consumer to “excessive preventable
danger” usually requires some type of alternative to be presented.
Although considerable controversy exists over this requirement’s
theoretical underpinnings,175 from a practical, trial and evidentiary
perspective, proof of a safer alternative design would present a
more persuasive and compelling case than one without such proof.
Indeed, on examination,176 most cases involve a plaintiff providing
171. See supra Part III.B.  In adopting the Barker test for risk-utility, the court
stated that the plaintiff must first prove “that the product’s design proximately
caused [the] injury” and then, liability will be imposed if “the defendant fails to
prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the chal-
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.”  Shanks, 835
P.2d at 1194 (citing Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska 1979), in turn citing Barker
v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978)).
172. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 886; see also Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 406
(Alaska 1985).
173. See Colt Indus. Operating Corp., Quincy Compressor Div. v. Frank W.
Murphy Mfr., 822 P.2d 925, 929 (Alaska 1991) (providing the “two methods by
which plaintiffs can prove strict liability on the ground that a product is defectively
designed”:  (1) that the risks outweigh the benefits or (2) that the design exposes
the consumer to “excessive preventable danger”).
174. Id. (quoting Beck I, 593 P.2d at 885).
175. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 162 (discussing the theo-
retical underpinnings of the safer alternative design requirement).  These authors,
who were also Reporters for the Third Restatement, address the criticism and
controversy in some detail, ultimately concluding that the criticism is unwar-
ranted.
176. See id. at 914-17 (conducting such an examination).
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some proof of an alternative design,177 thus, the controversy may be
somewhat exaggerated.  Although an Alaskan plaintiff could rest
on the fact that the defendant is obligated, ultimately, to prove that
the benefits of the product, as designed, outweigh the risks, this
may not be a sound trial strategy.
The Third Restatement’s alternative design requirement may
have its greatest impact on products that are, by their very nature,
dangerous, such as ammunition,178 alcohol or tobacco.179  The Third
177. See Colt Indus. 822 P.2d at 929.  Colt Industries is a good example of what
the plaintiff can do to prove defect without specifically pointing to a reasonable
alternative design.  In Colt Industries, the third-party plaintiff had an expert testify
that the defendant’s design for sealing a safety switch on a compressor for a sand-
blaster was defective for three reasons:  (1) the type of solder seals used by the
manufacturer were unreliable and resulted in “cold joints” that were prone to
leaks; (2) the combination of metals with different chemical properties resulted in
“thermal cycling” leading to a propensity to fracture; and (3) the type of solder
utilized melted too easily at low temperatures.  See id. at 929.  Here, the third-
party plaintiff affirmatively set forth reasons why the design utilized by the com-
ponent manufacturer was defective, and in essence, such evidence would allow the
trier of fact to conclude that a safer design or manufacturing method was avail-
able.  See id. at 931.
178. In McCarthy v. Olin Corp., the majority affirmed the dismissal of a prod-
ucts liability suit against the manufacturer of hollow-point bullets for reasons mir-
roring the Third Restatement’s position.  119 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 1997)  Judge
Calabresi voiced his dissent explaining both his preference for the consumer ex-
pectation test and his conclusion that the “talons” designed into the bullet created
a fact question under the risk-benefit test.  Id. at 170-75 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
179. One writer points out the inadequacies of the Third Restatement relative
to tobacco:
Cigarettes again present the drafters with a need to reconcile two equally
persistent notions:  that a product’s true costs ought to be reflected in the
market price, and that one ought not disrupt the relative economic tran-
quillity of those who make a product, the true costs of which overwhelm
any putative benefits. . . . Eschewing the supposed ambiguity inherent in
the phrase “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” the newest re-
vision distinguishes between manufacturing, design, and warning defects,
and announces, with respect to design defects, that there can be no li-
ability short of the plaintiff establishing the existence of a reasonable al-
ternative design.  The draft elsewhere asserts that whiskey and cigarettes
must be judged by the “reasonable alternative design” test making it
clear that this version, like its predecessor, refuses to countenance the
possibility that cigarettes in their intended state are defective. . . .  Rather
than legal doctrine influencing the behavior of those who produce and
distribute products, it can be argued that concern about particular prod-
ucts—especially tobacco—has significantly influenced the development
of the substantive law.  The successful effort to ensure that a lethal prod-
uct not reflect its true social costs may have contributed substantially to
the incoherence which is at the heart of products liability doctrine.
While tobacco is hardly the only product capable of causing damage
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Restatement essentially immunizes these products since there is no
alternative design that still intoxicates or kills as intended.180  With
these products, the dangerous nature of the product is the essence
of the product:  Alcohol intoxicates and is potentially addictive,
and nicotine creates physiological changes and is also potentially
addictive.  Any alternative product that did not provide physiologi-
cal changes would not be a true alternative.  Thus, for these types
of products, Alaska law currently would provide the trier of fact
with other factors to consider instead of being limited solely to the
Third Restatement’s alternative design factor.  Additionally,
Alaska law could evaluate such a product on whether it has any
real utility in light of the comparatively high risk of injury in de-
termining whether it is defective, a prospect not as easily accom-
plished or possible under the Third Restatement.
There are four additional developments in both Alaska law
and the Third Restatement that will be addressed here:  (1)
Alaska’s rejection of the Second Restatement’s “unreasonably
dangerous” standard; (2) the Third Restatement’s “not reasonably
safe” standard compared to the Second Restatement’s “unrea-
sonably dangerous” standard; (3) the consumer expectation test for
design defect in the Alaska and the rejection of that test in the
Third Restatement; and (4) the expansion of comment k from the
Second Restatement into section 6 of the Third Restatement and
the conformity of section 6 with Alaska law.
A. Alaska’s Rejection of the Second Restatement’s
“Unreasonably Dangerous” Standard
The Second Restatement required that a plaintiff prove a
product was “unreasonably dangerous” before a defect could be
found.181  Alaska was one of a few jurisdictions to expressly reject182
when used as directed (the 1964 Restaters pointed to prescription drugs
and alcohol as well), it may well be the only product which cannot be
used safely, and has no apparent substantial utility beyond satisfying the
craving created by its use.
Givelber, supra note 44, at 870-71.
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. c (1998) (stating
that common and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, to-
bacco, firearms and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be defective
only upon proof that reasonable alternative designs could have been adopted and
not simply because “they are considered socially undesirable by some segments of
society”).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
182. See Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Co.,
604 P.2d 1113, 1116 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (“We have rejected the requirement that
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the “unreasonably dangerous” requirement.183 As explained in Bu-
taud I
[w]e thus announce that this court will follow the view taken by
the California Supreme Court in Greenman, Cronin and
Luque. . . .
In Cronin, the California Supreme Court opined that a plaintiff
seeking recovery based on strict liability in tort need not prove
that the defect made the product “unreasonably dangerous” to the
user or consumer.  The court stated that having to prove the ele-
ment of “unreasonably dangerous” as required by the Restate-
ment places an added burden on the plaintiff not consonant with
Greenman.
Having the plaintiff prove not only that the product contained a
defect, but also that the defect made the product “unreasonably
dangerous,” would place a heavier burden on the plaintiff than
that articulated in Greenman.  It represents a step backwards in
the development of products liability cases.  The purpose of
strict liability is to overcome the difficulty of proof inherent in
negligent and warranty theories, thereby insuring that the costs
of physical injuries are borne by those who market defective
products.184
Thus, Alaska law consistently held that a plaintiff need only prove
a defect exists, not that the defect made the product unreasonably
dangerous.  In this regard, Alaska made a significant departure
the product be ‘unreasonably dangerous.’”); Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 878-83 (Alaska
1979); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 250 n. 2 (Alaska 1977).
183. Courts in other states have rejected the “unreasonably dangerous” for-
mulation set forth in section 402(A).  See, e.g., Hansen v. Sunnyside Products, 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d 266, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention,
California has not rejected section 402A in its entirety but only its ‘unreasonably
dangerous’ language.”); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972);
Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); McJunkin v. Kaufman &
Broad Home Systems, Inc., 748 P.2d 910, 917 (Mont. 1987) (“The dual test pro-
pounded by the commentaries to section 402A . . . has been criticized as ‘vague
and very imprecise.’  It is unfortunate perhaps that section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts provides that as a basis for recovery it must be found that
the product was both ‘defective’ and ‘unreasonably dangerous’ when as a matter
of fact the term ‘unreasonably dangerous’ was meant only as a definition of defect.
The phrase was not intended as setting forth two requirements but only one.”).
Other courts “reject” the “rejection” of this standard.  See McBride v. Ford Motor
Co., 673 P.2d 55, 64 (Idaho 1983) (“[W]e reject the Cronin case and its elimination
of the ‘unreasonably dangerous’ proof requirement.”).
184. Butaud I, 543 P.2d 209, 213-14 (Alaska 1975) (emphasis added); see also
Beck I, 593 P.2d at 878 (noting that the court previously “rejected the standard
proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the plaintiff demonstrate that
the product’s defect rendered it ‘unreasonably dangerous’”).
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from the Second Restatement section 402A, which embodied the
“unreasonably dangerous” standard as its primary threshold.
Certainly the reasons expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court
in rejecting the unreasonably dangerous standard are sound.
Moreover, the implication that one could design and market a
“somewhat” dangerous product — as long as it was not “unrea-
sonably dangerous” — is arguably a reckless policy that would not
further better manufacturing processes or safer products.  That a
certain level of risk may be acceptable with products is true.  Oth-
erwise, were there to be no risk, people might drive tanks instead
of cars made out of relatively flimsy sheet metal.  Indeed, the es-
sence of the risk-utility test weighs the product risk with its pur-
ported benefits.  But the concept that there are acceptable levels of
product danger may be pernicious.  For example, would a product
that killed or maimed 20% of the users be “unreasonably danger-
ous” but a product with a death rate of only 2% or 1% be accept-
able or “reasonably dangerous”?  The answer ultimately lies with
the trier of fact, but by rejecting this standard and simply requiring
a consumer to establish that the product is defective, the law in
Alaska seeks to establish higher manufacturing and safety aspira-
tions than would otherwise exist.
B. The Third Restatement’s “Reasonably Safe” Standard Versus
The Second Restatement’s “Unreasonably Dangerous”
Standard:  Old Wine In A New Bottle
The Third Restatement sections 2(b) and 2(c) utilize a positive
standard for design-based liability using the term “not reasonably
safe” instead of section 402A’s use of the “unreasonably danger-
ous” standard.185  This change reflects the drafters’ recognition that
many courts choose to promote reasonable safety as opposed to
simply imposing liability for unreasonable dangerousness.  The key
question for the Alaska courts, however, is whether the Third Re-
statement’s use of the term “not reasonably safe” comports with
the Alaska Supreme Court’s rejection of the “unreasonably dan-
gerous” standard from the Second Restatement’s section 402A.  In
other words, if the Third Restatement is merely changing the se-
mantics from the Second Restatement without any change in sub-
stantive application, it stands to reason that this standard would
likewise be rejected by the Alaska Supreme Court, at least if the
185. See Owen, supra note 6, at 776-77.  By “positive,” it is meant that the ter-
minology focuses on product safety rather than product danger.  The language
change can be seen as an attempt to comport with the policies giving rise to prod-
ucts liability, such as safer products.  See id.
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court intended to adhere to its reasoning in Beck, Butaud and their
progeny.
The comment to sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Third Restate-
ment appears to recognize that the term “not reasonably safe” was
“substituted” for the term “unreasonably dangerous.”186  As a mere
substitute, without any intended change in the substantive applica-
tion, this part of the Third Restatement would conflict with Alaska
precedent.  By imposing the requirement that the plaintiff prove a
product is not “reasonably safe,” the Third Restatement would re-
quire an evidentiary burden exceeding the existing Alaska standard
that one need only prove a defect exists.  In light of Beck I’s hold-
ing that a plaintiff need not prove that a product was “unreasona-
bly dangerous,” the question remains whether the Alaska courts
should adopt sections 2(b) and 2(c)’s use of the term “not reasona-
bly safe.”
In addition, one ALI consultant reasoned that both sections
2(b) and 2(c) actually contain negligence principles, not “strict
products liability” principles, and thus use of the term “not rea-
sonably safe” incorporates the reasonableness standard embedded
in negligence principles.187  If this is indeed the intended result of
the Third Restatement, then the Alaska supreme court would need
to evaluate whether it would join a doctrinal shift requiring it to
abandon “strict liability” principles (to which it has steadfastly ad-
hered) and instead apply negligence standards for design defect or
warning/instruction defect.  To date there has been no indication
that the Alaska Supreme Court intends to merge negligence prin-
ciples with products liability doctrine.  Every statement directly
addressing this issue has confirmed the court’s intent to distinguish
between the doctrines.188
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b)–(c) Reporters’
Note IVA (1998) (discussing Professor Wade’s suggestion to “substitute” the “not
reasonably safe” terminology in the Third Restatement with the Second Restate-
ment’s use of the “unreasonably dangerous” terminology).
187. See Owen, supra note 6, at 755-67.
188. See Beck I, 593 P.2d 881, 886 (Alaska 1979) (stating that “we intend no
retreat from our holdings in Clary and Butaud I.  Negligence concepts will not di-
lute the plaintiff’s case because the trier of fact will concentrate on the nature of
the product in determining defectiveness rather than upon the conduct of the de-
fendant”); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alaska 1970) (noting that “the
focus of attention in strict liability cases is not on the conduct of the defendant,
but rather on the existence of the defective product which causes injuries”);
Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835
P.2d 1189, 1199 (Alaska 1992) (noting that “the policy underlying strict liability
warrants preserving the distinction between the doctrines”).
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On the other hand, the suggestion that section 2(b) should be
interpreted to mean that “a product is ‘not reasonably safe’ be-
cause a ‘reasonable alternative design’ was available” could be con-
strued to comport with risk-benefit analysis established in Alaska
law.189  Such a construction would not impose upon the plaintiff
anything more than is already required under Beck I’s option of
using the risk-utility test (and excluding for the moment the con-
sumer expectation test).190  In this manner, the court would not
simply be substituting the “unreasonably dangerous” standard al-
ready rejected with a new formulation of the term.  Moreover, it is
possible to construe the term “not reasonably safe” as another
formulation of the consumer expectation test in that a product can
be deemed defective if it was “not reasonably safe” from a con-
sumer expectation perspective.  This construction is not persuasive,
however, since it must bend both the Third Restatement and
Alaska law to meet in the middle.
According to one ALI consultant, with the creation of the
Third Restatement, the “Restatement slate . . . is now brushed
clean.”191  If the Restatement slate is cleared, then one could inter-
pret the Third Restatement in a manner to conform it to existing
precedent, such as superimposing the reasoning in Butaud I192 to
the application of sections 2(b) and 2(c).  Yet such a reconciliation
does not seem productive or necessary.  Alaska law should stand or
fall on the soundness of its reasoning — as should the Third Re-
statement.  There is no need to harmonize that which is irreconcil-
able.
It can also be argued that sections 2(b) and 2(c) (design defect
and warning/instruction defect) impose a burden on the plaintiff to
prove and establish “fault,” i.e., to prove an “unreasonably safe”
product thus constituting a defect.  The imposition of this duty is at
odds with the historical purpose of products liability — to eliminate
“the necessity for plaintiffs to prove fault by manufacturers of de-
fective products.”193  The policy reasons194 justifying the elimination
189. Owen, supra note 6, at 769.
190. 593 P.2d at 882-86.
191. Owen, supra note 6, at 777.
192. 543 P.2d 209 (reasoning that burden is on injured party to prove product
defect but injured party need not prove awareness of defect or that defect made
product unreasonably dangerous).
193. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 877.
194. See supra Part III.A. (discussing Beck I, 593 P.2d at 877-78; Clary v. Fifth
Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 247 (Alaska 1969) (following Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) and discussing the “incentive to
produce safer products” provided by liability for product defects).
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of this burden exist today no less than they did when the Alaska
Supreme Court first adopted products liability.195  Since the law in
Alaska is simply that the plaintiff must prove that a defect exists,
and there is no requirement that such a defect render the product
“unreasonably dangerous”196 or “not reasonably safe,” it would be
consistent for the Alaska Supreme Court to reject the “not rea-
sonably safe” standard of the Third Restatement.  If, on the other
hand, the court intended a doctrinal change, then this standard
could well be considered.  However, since the court’s reasoning for
rejecting the “unreasonably dangerous” standard has as much or
more cogency today as it did in Beck, there is no reason for a doc-
trinal change.  Accordingly, the Third Restatement’s requirement
of establishing that the defect rendered the product “not reasona-
bly safe” should be rejected in Alaska.
C. The Consumer Expectation Test in Alaska and the Third
Restatement’s Rejection of the Test
As discussed above, Alaska has embraced the consumer ex-
pectation test.  Indeed, Alaska has applied a modified consumer
expectation test in the context of prescription medications, making
it one of the only jurisdictions to do so.197  Alaska’s endorsement of
this theory of liability was exemplified in General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth,198 where the court responded to an argument that this
test was not appropriate for complex design cases:
In addition, our initial reasons for adopting the consumer expec-
tation test are sound.  In Beck [I], we adopted the test as part of
Alaska’s product liability law partly because it “incorporates no-
tions of the implied warranty of fitness for reasonable use, a
primary concept in the evolution of strict products liability. . . .”
The “implied warranty of fitness or merchantability requires that
goods ‘be fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods are
used.’”199
The Alaska Supreme Court has faced two direct challenges to the
consumer expectation test, and each time it has reaffirmed its vi-
ability as a basis for products liability.200  This is particularly note-
195. See generally Clary, 454 P.2d 244 (adopting products liability doctrine in
Alaska).
196. See Beck I, 593 P.2d at 878; Butaud I, 543 P.2d 209, 214 (Alaska 1975).
197. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194-98 (Alaska 1992).
198. 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
199. Id. at 1221 (quoting Beck I, 593 P.2d at 885 n.49 (in turn quoting ALASKA
STAT. § 45.05.096(b)(3) (Michie 1996), now renumbered as ALASKA STAT. §
45.02.314(3) (LEXIS 1998))).
200. See id. at 1220-21 (“GM argues that the consumer expectation test does
not make sense . . . [but] our initial reasons for adopting the consumer expectation
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worthy in the context of the Third Restatement, which not only
abandons the consumer expectation test altogether, but also im-
poses a general requirement that the plaintiff prove a “reasonable
alternative design” under the risk-utility test.201  So far, the courts
have not fully embraced the “feasible alternative design” as the
only source for product liability under the risk-benefit test.202
Although the Third Restatement rejects the consumer expec-
tation test as a basis for establishing product design defect, it allows
for its admissibility to help establish the foreseeability and risk of
harm under the risk portion of the risk-benefit test.203  The com-
mentary reasons that
[c]onsumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into ac-
count whether the proposed alternative design could be imple-
mented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design
would provide greater overall safety. . . .  Thus, although con-
sumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard
for judging the defectiveness of product designs,204 they may sub-
stantially influence or even be ultimately determinative on risk-
utility balancing . . . .205
Other courts do not appear reluctant to part ways with the
consumer expectation test.206  The Ninth Circuit, for instance, noted
test are sound.”); Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195 (“[R]ather than completely discard an
expectation prong, we believe one can be tailored to reflect the unique nature of
prescription drugs and the role of the doctor in the decision to use a particular
drug.”).
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 162, at 908-09.
202. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).  The
Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Third Restatement provisions in this regard,
and adhered to its prior law that essentially allows the parties to present evidence
of consumer expectations, “to argue that the utility of a design outweighs its
risks . . . or any other theory supported by the evidence.”  Rodriguez v. Suzuki
Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 65 (Mo. 1999).
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998) (stating
that consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging
the defectiveness of product designs”).
204. The Third Restatement embraces the use of the consumer expectation test
in the context of food products and used products, however.  Id.  The commentary
explains that, for example, whether the presence of adulterated food constitutes a
manufacturing defect “is best determined by focusing on reasonable consumer ex-
pectations.”  Id. cmt. h.
205. Id. cmt. g.
206. The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the status of other jurisdictions, and
concluded that the determination of which states apply the consumer expectation
test is under scholarly debate.  See Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1220 n.15 (citing Mar-
shall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability:  The ALI Restatement
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in dicta its approval of the Third Restatement’s rejection of the
consumer expectation test, reasoning that the risk-utility approach
is sufficient by itself to determine whether a product is defective.207
Unlike the Alaska Supreme Court in Shanks and Farnsworth, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit did not conduct an extensive analysis of the
consumer expectation test’s origins in implied warranty theory, nor
did it carefully consider the benefits of this test.208  Because the con-
sumer expectation test was developed to address specific eviden-
tiary and public policy concerns, one would expect a closer scrutiny
of these rationales before this test is discarded.
Because of the Alaska Supreme Court’s reliance on the con-
sumer expectation test, it is not surprising, based on prior decisions,
that the court would extend the test to apply to the area of design
defects.209  Certainly the reasons set forth in the commentary to the
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 666 (1995), and reasoning that “the cases repeat-
edly cited by the reporters leave considerable room for interpretation” and ex-
plaining that the author’s independent review of fourteen of these cases revealed
that only one to three provided strong support for the proposition that American
courts predominantly rely on the risk-benefit test as opposed to the consumer ex-
pectation test”) (also citing John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes:  The
American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability
Design Defects — A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM.  L.
REV. 493, 556-57, 951-53 (1996), where the author conducted a survey concluding
that nineteen jurisdictions “apply an ordinary consumer expectation test to design
defect cases as an exclusive or independent and alternative measure of strict li-
ability design defects”).
207. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)
(construing California law).  “Under the proposed Restatement, the consumer ex-
pectation test no longer ‘constitute[s] an independent standard for judging the de-
fectiveness of product designs.’”  Id. at 1441.  Instead, the focus is on the reason-
ableness of the design and the plaintiff’s ability to prove that a reasonable
alternative design would have reduced foreseeable risks of harm.  See id.  “Al-
though we need not, and do not, adopt the formulation of the Restatement
(Third) at this time, it provides support for our holding that a focus on the design’s
benefits, risks, and feasible alternatives is a better approach to examining an al-
leged design defect.”  Id.
208. See id. at 1441; see also Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1221 (“In addition, our ini-
tial reasons for adopting the consumer expectation test are sound. . . . we adopted
the test as part of Alaska’s products liability law partly because it ‘incorporates
notions of the implied warranty of fitness for reasonable use, a primary concept in
the evolution of strict products liability. . . .’”).
209. See generally Beck I, 593 P.2d 881 (Alaska 1979).  The court in Beck I
carefully addressed the role of consumer expectations in design defect cases, rea-
soning that “a product is defectively designed if it fails ‘to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foresee-
able manner’ [thereby incorporating] notions of the implied warranty of fitness for
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Third Restatement justifying the rejection of the consumer expec-
tation test can be viewed as tautological.  The expressed concern
that the consumer expectation test does not “take into account
whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at
reasonable cost”210 in fact merges the consumer expectation test
with the risk-utility test.  This amounts to merging two separate
doctrines and then justifying the dismissal of one on the basis that
it does not consider the factors of the other.  Without a complete
disregard of Alaska precedent and a departure from the core poli-
cies supporting the adoption of products liability in Alaska, when
addressing section 2 of the Third Restatement, the Alaska supreme
court will most likely reject the portion of the Third Restatement
that abandons the consumer expectation test.  The court will also
likely modify section 2 of the Third Restatement to include the
consumer expectation test prior to adopting that section, as it did in
Butaud I and Shanks.211  In this manner, the Alaska supreme court
can retain the best of both doctrines. 212
With the issues discussed above in mind, it should be pointed
out that there appear to be many subsections and comments to sec-
tions 2(a)–(d) that fit harmoniously within the products liability ru-
bric established in Alaska.  As discussed earlier, the general
framework and principles of the Third Restatement conform to
most of the general principles and framework established in
Alaska, including the general breakdown of three categories for
potential liability.213  For example, subsection (d) focuses on viola-
tions of administrative, regulatory or statutory manufacturing stan-
dards and incorporates a per se liability approach to these cases.214
This is congruent with Alaska law.  Further, comment e to section 2
embraces the concept that products that combine high risk and
marginal social utility may be defective even if there is no safer al-
reasonable use, a primary concept in the evolution of strict products liability . . .
[which] eases the burden of proof on the plaintiff.”  Id. at 885.
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).
211. Butaud I , 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975) (modifying the Second Restatement
prior to adoption); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992) (also modi-
fying the Second Restatement prior to adoption).
212. It should be noted that there is considerable dispute with the Third Re-
statement position rejecting the consumer expectation test.  The test may be more
widely followed than the Third Restatement is willing to concede. See Shapo, su-
pra note 206, at 666 (arguing that the case law cited by the Third Restatement al-
lows for extensive interpretation and concluding that as few as one to three of
these cases provides real support for the Third Restatement position); Vargo, su-
pra note 206, at 556-57.
213. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(d) (1998).
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ternative design.215  An example of this could be firecrackers (some
might argue alcohol or tobacco as well, notwithstanding the Third
Restatement’s immunization of these products).  This approach is
also consistent with Alaska law.  Other than the major discrepan-
cies addresses by this Article, the remaining differences and issues
to be adjudicated occur in the commentaries.
D. Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:  Section 6 of the
Third Restatement Does Not Completely Conform With
Shanks
As briefly discussed earlier, the court in Shanks v. Upjohn
Co.216 rejected comment k of the Second Restatement, which pro-
vides immunity from liability for drug manufacturers.217  The
Shanks court held that the risk-benefit test adopted in Beck I
would apply to design defect claims involving prescription medica-
tions.218  Section 6 of the Third Restatement addresses the liability
of a “seller, or other distributor, for harm caused by defective pre-
scription drugs or medical devices.”219  Section 6 defines manufac-
turing, warning and design defects for prescription drugs and medi-
cal devices, and incorporates the learned intermediary defense into
these types of claims.220  For example, in a defective warning claim
involving a prescription drug, the classic learned intermediary de-
fense provides that “a prescription drug manufacturer satisfies the
duty to warn if it provides adequate warnings to the prescribing
physician.”221
The learned intermediary defense (as provided in comment k
in the Second Restatement) was rejected in Shanks.222  Instead, the
court modified the consumer expectation test to include the rea-
sonable expectations of the prescribing physician:
215. See id. § 2 cmt. e.
216. 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992).  Other courts took the same approach.
See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 956 (Nev. 1994) (“This court re-
jects the idea of freeing drug manufacturers from liability for defective drugs sim-
ply because they claim that the drugs are reasonably or unavoidably dangerous.”).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  Comment k
provided that no liability should be imposed against drug manufacturers “merely
because [they have] undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.”  Id.
Comment k further provided that drug manufacturers or sellers should “not be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use.”  Id.
218. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1196-97.
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998).
220. Id. § 6(b)–(d).
221. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195 n.6.
222. Id. at 1202.
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In a sense, prescribing doctors are the consumers of prescription
drugs.  It is the doctor’s evaluation of the patient’s condition and
consideration of the available treatment alternatives which leads
to the choice of a specific prescription drug product.  Also, the
doctor has ready access to the FDA-approved warning informa-
tion contained in the package insert and the Physicians’ Desk
Reference.  Thus it is the doctor’s expectation, and not that of
the patient, regarding the performance and safety of prescription
drugs which is the relevant inquiry in the imposition of strict li-
ability.223
Accordingly, to the extent section 6 of the Third Restatement in-
corporates the learned intermediary defense, it is in conflict with
the holding in Shanks.224  Since the learned intermediary defense of
the Third Restatement’s section 6 stems from comment k of the
Second Restatement, absent a turn-about by the Alaska Supreme
Court, this part of the Third Restatement should not weave its way
into Alaska law.  Moreover, the court in Shanks viewed claims in-
volving drugs or medical devices as essentially the same as other
products in that no special immunity would be carved out for these
products; rather, these products could be judged under a risk-utility
analysis for design defect like any other product.225  This appears to
be the view followed by other courts as well.226  The discussion re-
garding products liability for drugs or medical devices for design
defect may not apply to claims of product warning or instruction
defect, due to the possibility of federal preemption in this area.227
223. Id. at 1195.
224. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e
(1998).
225. 835 P.2d at 1198.
226. See West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 611-13 (Ark. 1991) (applying
the risk-utility test against a drug); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954
(Nev. 1994) (utilizing the risk-utility test against a design defect claim of a drug).
Some courts have taken a middle approach and evaluated a specific drug or device
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether special immunity should apply.  See,
e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308-09 (Idaho 1987) (determining that
comment k would not automatically provide “blanket immunity” but evaluating
drugs on a case-by-case method); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924
(Kan. 1990); White v. Wyeth Labs., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1988).
227. Preemption may occur where specific warnings and instructions are man-
dated by the Food and Drug Administration.  In product warning cases involving
drugs or medical devices, the potential impact of federal regulation and federal
preemption must be considered because state law products liability claims for de-
fective warning may not be viable in this context.  Section 6, comment b of the
Third Restatement addresses the potential impact of federal preemption and
bases its provision on the assumption that “the federal regulatory standard has not
preempted the imposition of tort liability under state law.”  RESTATEMENT
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The drafters of the Third Restatement set forth several rea-
sons supporting the learned intermediary defense, including the
concern “over the possible negative effects of judicially imposed
liability on the cost and availability of valuable medical technol-
ogy.”228  This very reason was considered and rejected by the court
in Shanks v. Upjohn Co.:229
While the social utility and value of prescription drugs as a class
of products may exceed that of most other classes of products,
we do not believe that this generalization warrants granting “the
same protection from liability to those who gave us thalidomide
as to the producers of penicillin.”  Further, we find it speculative
at best that restricting strict liability design defect claims against
prescription drug manufacturers will serve the public interest by
enhancing the availability and affordability of prescription
drugs. . . .  Finally, we find it consistent with the purposes un-
derlying strict products liability that manufacturers should be de-
terred from marketing certain products and that the cost of the
defense of strict products liability litigation and any resulting
judgments should be borne by the manufacturer who is able to
spread the cost through insurance and by charging more for its
products.230
In short, contrary to section 6 of the Third Restatement and com-
ment k of the Second Restatement, the Alaska Supreme Court
found no persuasive basis to single out prescription drugs and
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998).  The United States Supreme
Court held in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr that federal preemption occurs only where
the state requirement applies to a medical device and that requirement is “differ-
ent from or in addition to” FDA requirements under the Medical Device
Amendments Act of 1976 (amending the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996); see also Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243 (7th
Cir. 1997).  Accordingly, the relevant inquiry in any particular case is whether the
state-based claim for product defect would impose a different or additional re-
quirement than one already imposed by the FDA.  Of course, if the FDA has not
imposed a requirement governing an aspect of the product that is allegedly defec-
tive, then no preemption would apply.  See generally National Bank of Commerce
of El Dorado v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Medical Device Amendment Act of 1976 only preempts claim for failure to warn
because FDA only specifically regulated warning label of product, so design de-
fect claim could proceed in state court).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998).
229. 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992) (recognizing “that the threat of prod-
ucts liability litigation in general may impair the ability of drug manufacturers to
obtain liability insurance and may cause beneficial drugs to be withdrawn from the
market” but concluding that superior public policy considerations outweigh this
concern).
230. Id. at 1195-96 (citations omitted).
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medical devices for immunity from liability.231  Concern over the
availability of these products “has no greater relevance . . . than to
other products having life-saving or life-bettering characteristics.”232
Indeed, if prescription drugs or medical devices were singled out
for special product treatment, it would only be a matter of time be-
fore the list would grow to add seatbelts, airbags, floatation de-
vices, brakes, food and nutritional products, and any number of
other products that are intended to save or improve lives.  Al-
though one can argue there is a normative difference between pre-
scription drugs or medical devices in contrast to a car, oven or mo-
torcycle (and the ALI did in fact so argue), a more comprehensive
view recognizes that drug and medical device manufacturers pro-
duce products for profit, like other manufacturers, and should be
subject to the same goal of manufacturing the safest product rea-
sonably possible (as the court recognized in Shanks).233
Section 6 is problematic for other reasons as well.234  In com-
plete opposition to Shanks, section 6(c) confers almost complete
immunity from design defect claims for drug manufacturers.235
Rather than apply the risk-benefit test, the Third Restatement
would impose liability only where there is absolutely no benefit to
any member of a patient class.236  This would have the practical ef-
fect of immunizing most medications from products liability.237
How hard would it be to find just one physician to testify that the
drug, with all of its debilitating effects or risks, is still better than
the illness or death suffered by the patient?  It would not be prob-
lematic at all.  On this basis, a drug that poses substantial risks to
many people and causes great harm would not be subject to liabil-
ity if at least some people may gain benefits.  Further, the goals of
231. See id.
232. Id. at 1196 (citing Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989)).
233. See id. at 1197 (providing the risk-benefit analysis that should be under-
taken in a prescription drug products liability case).
234. The related section 8(c), pertaining to medical device liability, has been
similarly criticized.  See Jeffrey Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Re-
statement (Third) of Torts:  Is It Really What The Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 644 (1997).
235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998).
236. Id. § 6(c) cmt. a (noting that “the only prescription drugs and medical de-
vices that are shouldered with design defect claims are those that provide no net
benefit to any ascertainable patient class”).
237. Some type of liability could squeak by, such as liability for manufacturing
defect if, for example, the manufacturer erroneously labeled the medication as
containing 10 mg when in fact the medication contained twice that amount.  Li-
ability for defective warning, instruction or design, however, would likely be pre-
cluded.
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products liability, including the development of safer and better
medications and the allocation of risk among all manufacturers and
consumers through risk spreading and insurance, would be
thwarted.  Arguably, the Third Restatement approach grants far
too much deference to FDA oversight, oversight limited by politi-
cal and budgetary considerations, at the expense of judicial reme-
dies that have fewer limitations.  The Alaska Supreme Court has
expressed reservations in deferring to this governmental agency.238
Thus, in evaluating section 6, the courts in Alaska should use cau-
tion and tread carefully.  This is one part of the Third Restatement
that does not conform with existing policy or precedent.
E. Product Warning
Several sections of the Third Restatement mirror Alaska law
and could be incorporated into Alaska precedent without legal
contortion.  For instance, Alaska law on defective warning estab-
lishes that where “the product as marketed posed a risk of injury to
one who uses the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner and
the product is marketed without adequate warnings of the risk, the
product is defective.”239  As discussed above, once that is estab-
lished, liability will be imposed unless “the defendant manufacturer
can prove that the risk was scientifically unknowable at the time
the product was distributed to the plaintiff.”240  To establish that a
warning is defective or inadequate, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the warning did not  “(1) clearly indicate the scope of the risk
or danger posed by the product; (2) reasonably communicate the
extent or seriousness of harm that could result from the risk or
danger; and (3) [convey this information] in such a manner as to
alert the reasonably prudent person.”241
Importantly, a manufacturer cannot “warn away” its liability;
“[w]here the most stringent warning does not protect the public,
the defect itself must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to avoid
238. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197 n.10 (Alaska 1992) (“[A]
deferential standard of review is appropriate when directly reviewing an agency
decision . . . [however] such deference in the face of allegations of serious injuries
caused by FDA-approved drugs would amount to an abdication of judicial respon-
sibility.”).
239. Id. at 1199 (citing Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska
1984)).
240. Id. at 1200 (citing Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d
1059, 1063-64 (Alaska 1979); Beck II, 624 P.2d 790, 792 (Alaska 1981)).
241. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc.,
537 P.2d 682, 691-93 (1975)).
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liability.”242  The Third Restatement section 2(c) comment i mirrors
Alaska law in this respect, and provides that although manufactur-
ers have the responsibility to warn to render a product safe, warn-
ings are not a substitute for a safer design.243  Indeed, the Third Re-
statement rejects the Second Restatement’s recognition of any
presumption or defense that assumes the consumer will read and
follow the warning, concluding that “when a safer design can rea-
sonably be implemented and risk can reasonably be designed out
of a product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warn-
ing.”244  Accordingly, the absence of necessary warnings will render
a product defective, but the ultimate focus in both the Third Re-
statement and Alaska law is not on warnings but rather on safer
designs and safer products.  Presumably the safest product would
not need any warnings since it has been designed and manufac-
tured in such a manner that no warnings are necessary.  If the risk
or danger associated with a product cannot be eliminated by better
design, then appropriate warnings must be given to avoid liability.
Even then, however, liability may not be avoided if even the most
“stringent warning” would not eliminate the danger.245
The Third Restatement section 2(b) rejects the “open and ob-
vious” defense to a design defect claim.246  This defense precluded
liability where the risk of injury is patent and observable to the rea-
sonably prudent consumer.247  Alaska, however, has previously rec-
ognized the “open and obvious” defense248 only in the context of a
failure to warn theory, reasoning that it has “refused to impose
strict liability based upon failure to warn of ‘hazards or dangers
242. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979).
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998); see also
Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Uniroyal Goodrich
Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998).
245. Sturm, 594 P.2d at 44.
246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d, illus. 3 (1998).
247. See, e.g., Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 321 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Ga. App.
Ct. 1984) (“[I]f a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine
function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is with-
out any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not
known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law’s demands.  We
have not yet reached the state where a manufacturer is under the duty of making a
machine accident proof or foolproof . . . .”); In re Complaint of Diehl, 610 F. Supp.
223, 227 (D. Idaho 1985) (affirming dismissal of claim for product defect relative
to a sail boat with an aluminum mast that contacted an overhead power line and
reasoning that it “was patently obvious that the aluminum mast incorporated in
the design of the boat could and would readily conduct electricity”).
248. Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc., 925 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Alaska 1996).
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that would be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the prod-
uct.’”249  It is critical to distinguish between this defense and the
theory asserted by the plaintiff relative to the “obviousness de-
fense.”250  While obviousness of danger may be a defense to a fail-
ure to warn claim, it is not a recognized defense to a design claim.251
Indeed, if the danger is obvious, arguably a better design is all the
more imperative, unless the product is inherently dangerous and
cannot be made any safer.  These are questions of fact under the
risk-benefit test, however.
The Third Restatement’s provisions regarding “obviousness”
relative to a failure to warn theory conform with existing Alaska
law.252  To establish a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must prove
that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers arising
from a foreseeable use of the product and that the breach of that
duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.253  If the
failure to warn is the proximate cause of the injury, then “the
manufacturer is strictly liable unless the defendant manufacturer
249. Id. (citing Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984)).  The
court in Prince reiterated that “there is no duty to warn of hazards or dangers that
would be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product.”  685 P.2d at 88.
250. In Prince, for example, the plaintiff alleged “that the manufacturer failed
to adequately warn of the difficulty of managing its parachute.” 685 P.2d at 85.
He further claimed that “had [there] been a warning sewn into the Paradactyl, or
if he had been told to read a manual which contained an adequate warning and
had learned that the parachute was too advanced for him, he would never have
used it.”  Id. at 86.  The plaintiff did not claim that the parachute itself was defec-
tively designed or manufactured but instead pursued the theory that the “product,
although faultlessly manufactured and designed, can be defective when placed in
the consumers’ hands without first giving an adequate warning concerning the
manner in which to safely use the product.” Id. at 87.  The claim rested on the dif-
ficulty in managing that parachute, which was not “open and obvious” simply by
looking at the product.  One would have to use the product to learn of this prob-
lem.
251. See Ogletree v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570, 571-72 (Ga.
1998) (reasoning that in design defect cases, the “overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions have held that the open and obvious nature of the danger does not pre-
clude liability for design defects”).  The Third Restatement recognizes this posi-
tion and rejects the “open and obvious” defense in design cases.  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998).
253. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199-1200 (Alaska 1992) (“Un-
der a strict liability failure to warn theory, if the plaintiff proves that the product
as marketed posed a risk of injury to one who uses the product in a reasonably
foreseeable manner and the product is marketed without adequate warnings of
the risk, the product is defective.”).
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can prove that the risk was scientifically unknowable at the time
the product was distributed to the plaintiff.”254
A manufacturer need not provide a warning when “the dan-
ger, or [potentiality] of danger, is generally known and recog-
nized.”255  Section 2, comment i of the Third Restatement provides
that no duty exists to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk
avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known
by, foreseeable product users.256  Under Alaska law, whether a duty
exists is a question of law,257 but the question whether a risk is obvi-
ous or generally known is a question of fact to be decided by the
trier of fact.258  This is compatible with the Third Restatement ap-
proach.259
F. The Crashworthiness Doctrine
Another sub-category of products liability is safety products,
particularly those products incorporated into vehicles.  Referred to
as “crashworthiness” cases, both the Third Restatement and
Alaska law address this area.260  Alaska products liability law rec-
ognized the crashworthiness doctrine in General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth.261  The “crashworthiness doctrine,” also known as the
“enhanced injury doctrine” or “second collision doctrine,” is a re-
cent development in the area of products liability law, both nation-
254. Id. at 1200.
255. Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984) (quoting Jackson
v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (“On the issue of
duty to warn, however, the question to be put to the jury is whether “the danger,
or potentially [sic] of danger, is generally known and recognized.”)).
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998).
257. See Parks Highway Enter. v. CEM Leasing, Inc., No. S-8593, 5236, 2000
WL 146849 at * 8 (Alaska Feb. 4, 2000).
258. See Prince, 685 P.2d at 88 (“Whether an ordinary parachutist would read-
ily recognize that a Paradactyl should be used by experienced parachutists only is
a question of fact on the record presented.”); Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly
of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221 (Alaska 1991) (“Whether King’s Way knew
or should have known of the danger that Gilman might sexually molest children
left in her care is a question of fact.”).
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998)
(“Where reasonable minds may differ as to whether the risk was obvious or gen-
erally known, the issue is to be decided by the trier of fact.”).
260. Id. §§ 16 cmt. a., 17, 2 cmt. p (“[A]n automobile may be defectively de-
signed so as to provide inadequate protection against harm in the event of a colli-
sion.”).  See generally General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska
1998).
261. 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
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ally262 and in Alaska.263  This doctrine recognizes that a vehicle oc-
cupant may be injured, or the injuries enhanced, by the very prod-
uct that was supposed to prevent or reduce injuries, such as a seat-
belt or an airbag.264  In Farnsworth, for example, the occupant was
seriously injured by “submarining” under a defectively designed
seatbelt.265  The crashworthiness of a vehicle can be measured by
the degree to which it protects the occupants from injury inside the
vehicle during the “second collision.”  The doctrine has been ap-
plied to cars, motorcycles, trucks, airplanes, helicopters and
boats.266
The crashworthiness doctrine also acknowledges that injuries
sustained in an accident may occur not only because of the initial
impact of the vehicle, but also because of a subsequent impact by
the occupant with the vehicle itself.267  Liability may be imposed for
product defect if the occupant’s injuries were enhanced as a result
of a design defect in the vehicle.  A key departure under Alaska
law is that a plaintiff may be able to prove a crashworthiness claim
under the consumer expectation test,268 a theory unavailable under
the Third Restatement.  Contrary to the Third Restatement, the
Farnsworth court stated:
GM buttresses its position by pointing out that the proposed
new Restatement of Torts and the majority of states do not al-
low recovery under the consumer expectation test without also
requiring that the product’s risks outweigh its benefits. . . .
262. One of the earliest cases in this area was Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968), where the court held that “a manufacturer is un-
der a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicles to avoid subjecting
the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.”
263. See generally Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209.  Farnsworth is the first Alaska
case to directly address this issue.
264. See generally Larsen, 391 F.2d 495; see also Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1219
(noting that “a crashworthiness claim rests on the idea that a defect enhanced the
plaintiff’s injuries”).
265. 965 P.2d at 1221.  The court also conformed this doctrine to Alaska’s ap-
plication of apportionment, allowing a defendant manufacturer to present evi-
dence and prove that even if the safety product was defective and was a “substan-
tial factor in causing” the consumer’s injuries, someone else’s conduct may have
also caused the harm and fault should be apportioned because “it should be the
proven wrongdoer who must bear the burden of limiting its liability.”  Id. at 1220.
266. See Lory J. Kraut, Crashworthiness, Strict Liability:  On a Collision Course,
57 DEF. COUNS. J. 150, 150 (1990).
267. See Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Wis.
1984) (noting that the plaintiff’s injury was not from the accident but “as a result
of his impact with defective seats”).
268. See Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1221.
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We agree with the California Supreme Court that consumers
can form reasonable and educated expectations about how cer-
tain products should perform. . . .  When a seat belt, designed to
be an instrument of protection, becomes an instrument of life-
threatening injury, a consumer is justified in concluding that it
did not perform as safely as promised.  A seat belt is a familiar
product whose basic function is well understood by the general
population.269
Accordingly, to the extent that the Third Restatement abandons
the consumer expectation test in most categories, including crash-
worthiness cases, it would not be persuasive authority in Alaska.
V.  PRESERVING THE DOCTRINAL WALL BETWEEN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
The Alaska Supreme Court has expressed a strong philosophi-
cal preference for keeping negligence theory out of, and distinct
from, products liability theory.  This is based on the underlying ra-
tionale supporting products liability, establishing that “greater effi-
ciency and justice would be achieved by eliminating the necessity
for plaintiffs to prove fault by manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts.”270  For example, in Bachner v. Pearson,271 the court stated that
“the focus of attention in strict liability cases is not on the conduct
of the defendant, but rather on the existence of the defective prod-
uct which causes injuries.”272  Therefore, in Bachner, negligence
principles had no application.273
Moreover, it was later deemed reversible error to include neg-
ligence concepts when instructing a jury.274  The court’s most recent
review of this matter resulted in the court’s reaffirmation that “the
policy underlying strict liability warrants preserving the distinction
between the doctrines.”275  In Beck I, the court grappled with the
problem of keeping products liability doctrine and negligence doc-
trines separate.  It reached a solution utilizing a substantive shift in
the burden of proof:
269. See id. at 1220-21 (stating “we cannot accept GM’s insinuation that ordi-
nary consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the minimum safety of the
products they use.  In particular circumstances, a product’s design may perform so
unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common reason, experience, and under-
standing of its ordinary consumers.”) (quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882
P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994)).
270. Beck I, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979).
271. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
272. Id. at 329.
273. Id.
274. See Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981).
275. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Alaska 1992).
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Although we believe that a balancing process is inevitable in cer-
tain design defect cases, we in no way intend to diminish our ad-
herence to the goals of strict products liability.  Therefore, we
also agree with the position taken by Barker regarding the allo-
cation of the burden of proof:
[I]nasmuch as . . . a manufacturer who seeks to es-
cape liability for an injury proximately caused by its
product’s design on a risk-benefit theory should bear
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that its
product should not be judged defective, the defen-
dant’s burden is one affecting the burden of proof,
rather than simply the burden of producing evi-
dence. . . .
We hold that the plaintiff need only show that he was injured
and that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s de-
sign.  The defendant may then avoid liability for a defectively
designed product by proving . . . “on balance, the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.”
Beck protests that adding further content to the meaning of
product defectiveness will be a retreat to negligence concepts,
will increase the plaintiff’s burden of proof, and will create a dis-
tinction between manufacturing and design defects.  As we have
stated above, we intend no retreat from our holdings in Clary
and Butaud I.  Negligence concepts will not dilute the plaintiff’s
case because the trier of fact will concentrate on the nature of
the product in determining defectiveness rather than upon the
conduct of the defendant.276
Notwithstanding the court’s reassurances and shift in the bur-
den of proof, under the risk-utility test, it is doctrinally difficult to
completely separate negligence principles from products liability
analysis.  One commentator reasoned that, notwithstanding the la-
bel of strict products liability, the “label was not entirely accurate
because the actual reasoning being performed frequently (and, for
fairness reasons, necessarily) focused on standard negligence issues
such as reasonableness and foreseeability.”277  Currently, Alaska
requires the fact finder to consider the following factors:
276. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 885-86 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
455, 458 (Cal. 1978)).
277. David K. Geiger & Stephanie Copp Martinez, Design and Warning Defect
Claims Under Massachusetts Product Liability Law:  Completing the Merger of
Negligence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON BAR J. 12, 13 (1999); see also O’Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983) (discussing the overlap of negligence
principles inherent within the risk-benefit test and reasoning that to the extent this
test “implicates the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct, strict liability
law continues to manifest that part of its heritage attributable to the law of negli-
gence”).
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the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an im-
proved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and
to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.278
As recognized in Beck I, there is an inherent and necessary task of
weighing and balancing under this test.  It appears that the trial
courts, if they are to remain true to the teachings in Beck I, would
carefully manage the jury through jury instructions that empha-
sized that the focus is on the product, not the manufacturer’s con-
duct, even though the manufacturer’s conduct will be in evidence.
The Third Restatement does away with the wall between
products liability and negligence relative to the risk-utility test and
takes the approach that, inherent in the process of determining
whether one design has benefits that outweigh another, the jury
will inevitably focus on the defendant’s conduct279 and knowledge
— the very factors products liability intended to avoid.280  In this
regard, the Third Restatement is not compatible with Alaska law.
If the Alaska courts adopt the Third Restatement requirement that
the plaintiff prove a reasonable alternative design in order to pre-
vail under a risk-utility analysis, then the wall between negligence
and products liability would likely crumble in this area, and a sub-
stantial doctrinal shift would result, including burden of proof allo-
cation.  Because the Alaska Supreme Court has concluded that
there is a distinct benefit in separating products liability principles
from negligence concepts, any application of the Third Restate-
ment, which often merges the two, must be closely reviewed.281  In
practical effect, language in the Third Restatement referring to
“foreseeable risks”282 or “reasonable instructions”283 and other neg-
ligence concepts may need to be reworded, if not redacted entirely,
to conform with current Alaska law.
278. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196-97 (Alaska 1992) (quoting
Beck I, 593 P.2d at 886 (in turn quoting Barker, 573 P.2d at 455)).
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
Comment d provides that the Third Restatement approach “is also used in ad-
ministering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence.”  Id.
280. See Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 411 (Alaska 1985) (“The focus of
attention in strict liability cases is not on the conduct of the defendant, but rather
on the existence of the defective product which causes injuries.  Liability is at-
tached, as a matter of policy, on the basis of the existence of a defect rather than
on the basis of the defendant’s negligent conduct.”) (citing Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alaska 1970)).
281. See Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1199.
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
283. See id. § 2(c).
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Alternatively, the Alaska Supreme Court could modify its po-
sition in this area, and recognize that the risk-utility test implicates
the manufacturer’s knowledge and conduct, at least to some de-
gree, and compares that knowledge and conduct with what other
manufacturers have done, or what experts in the area testify could
be (and should be) done.  While this modification would certainly
constitute a step away from established products liability reasoning,
and undercut some of the public policy goals giving rise to this doc-
trine, if the burden of proof allocation remained intact, the effect
could be minimized.  In light of the various public policy interests
that are at issue, this is an area that will need careful attention in
the future if it is to be changed.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The Third Restatement embodies the next step in the evolu-
tion of products liability.  Like its predecessor, section 402A of the
Second Restatement, it will no doubt influence courts and establish
a framework that many courts will utilize.  The Alaska Supreme
Court has demonstrated a pattern of critically and methodically
evaluating many of the key provisions of the Second Restatement,
resulting in only partial acceptance and sometimes outright rejec-
tion of Restatement positions.284  There is no reason to believe it
will not, and should not, do so with the Third Restatement.  In
General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth,285 the court compared its rea-
soning with selected portions of the Third Restatement, thus indi-
cating that the Third Restatement may be well on its way as a part
of Alaska law.
The courts in Alaska face unique circumstances and issues.
From the trial courts up to the Alaska Supreme Court, the vitality
of Alaska law is preserved by a careful review of the public policy
giving rise to the various doctrines.  Those provisions in the Third
Restatement that conform with, uphold and further these policy
considerations should have no problem being incorporated into
Alaska precedent.  Those provisions of the Third Restatement that
conflict with the stated goals and purposes of Alaska products li-
ability law should be, and probably will be, rejected.  In the end,
Alaska will in all likelihood adopt only portions of the Third Re-
statement, and implement a modified version of it, just as it did
with the Second Restatement.
284. See supra notes 66-133 and accompanying text.
285. 965 P.2d 1209, 1219-20 (Alaska 1998) (referring to the Third Restatement,
reasoning that “Alaska has explicitly adopted the Restatement’s rules for appor-
tioning injury in multiple tortfeasor cases,” and comparing its prior holdings with
the Third Restatement section 16 cmt. d).
